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Promoting human rights is an important foreign policy goal for the United States.
There are many foreign policy areas through which the U.S. promotes human rights
including voting against countries which violate human rights in the Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs). Promoting human rights, however, is not the only foreign
policy goal of the U.S. in the MDBs. The U.S. also seeks strategic goals such as
supporting allies and promoting domestic economic prosperity as well in the MDBs.
Realist international relations theory posits that strategic interests will trump promoting
human rights in the MDBs. For the U.S. however liberal international relations theory
argues that promoting human rights can be considered an equivalent foreign policy goal
for countries such as the U.S. Therefore strategic interests will not automatically trump
promoting human rights for the U.S.
This dissertation seeks to answer two questions regarding human rights in U.S.
foreign policy in the MDBs. First, what role do human rights play in determining U.S.
votes in the MDBs? Here I find that a country’s record on violating political rights is a
significant factor in determining whether the U.S. will vote in favor of proposals for that
country. A country’s record on violating rights of personal integrity, however, is not a
significant factor. Whether a country receives military aid from the U.S. and a country’s
GDP per capita are also significant determinants of U.S. votes in the MDBs. The second

question this dissertation answers regarding human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the
MDBs is what rights specifically does the U.S. promote in the MDBs and which
countries, specifically, does the U.S. vote against because of their human rights record.
Overall, I find that while the U.S. has voted against loans going to many countries for
human rights purposes the bulk of U.S. attention is centered on countries that fail to
apprehend war criminals within their borders, primarily Serbia, and voting against loans
that go to China.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem
Are U.S. votes in the multilateral development banks (MDBs) conditioned on
recipient countries respect for human rights? In other words does the U.S. sanction
countries with poor human rights records by voting to deny them loans in the MDBs? In
addition, what rights in particular does the U.S. seek to promote in the MDBs, and what
countries in particular are singled out for sanction by the U.S. in the MDBs? Human
rights have become an important fixture of American foreign policy over the last several
decades. However, the specific content of U.S. human rights policy, as well as its place
among foreign policy priorities more generally, has varied considerably over the years
(Forsythe 2002; Mertus 2004; Apodaca 2006; Blanton and Cingranelli 2010). Despite
the establishment of a stable body of international law on human rights from which to
draw from, there has been significant variability in how the U.S. promotes human rights
in its foreign policy, what rights it promotes, and what countries are targeted over others.
One of the main explanations for this inconsistency is that U.S. human rights policy is
simply a mask for pursuing core national security or economic interests, or in other words
the liberalism of human rights is ultimately trumped by the realpolitik of self-interest.
Foreign aid, whether distributed directly, through bilateral aid, or indirectly
through the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) is one of the tools through which
the U.S. furthers its human rights policy (Apodaca 2006). Using foreign aid to influence
another country’s human rights policies involves either using assistance as a positive
reinforcement – providing aid to those countries who have made improvements in the
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protection of human rights, or as a negative sanction – withholding aid to countries which
have an overall awful human rights record or are currently engaged in massive violations
of human rights. Several studies highlight the inconsistency with which the U.S.
promotes human rights with bilateral aid – conditioning aid on the human rights practices
of some states but not others. However, except for a brief flurry of research in the 1980s,
very few studies examine the role of human rights in U.S. multilateral aid policy. The
U.S. has to vote on whether it will support or oppose every loan or grant proposal that
comes before the World Bank and the rest of the MDBs. Therefore, the purpose of this
dissertation is twofold. First, to answer the question of whether U.S. votes in the MDBs
are conditioned on recipient countries respect for human rights, and second, to identify
which rights the U.S. promotes in the MDBs and which specific countries it targets for
their human rights record in the MDBs.

Reasons for Re-Evaluation
For a period during the 1980s the study of U.S. human rights policy in the MDBs
was given some attention (Sanford 1982; Schoultz 1982; Mower Jr. 1987; Forsythe 1987;
Forsythe 1988; and Stohl et al. 1989). The main impetus for this surge in interest was the
passage of the International Financial Institutions Act in 1977 (IFI Act). Section 701 of
the IFI act instructed the U.S. Executive Directors (USEDs) in the MDBs to use their
“voice and vote” to direct assistance away from countries which systematically violate
individual human rights unless the assistance would directly contribute to the basic
human needs of the recipient countries citizens. Many of these early studies examined
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the U.S. record on human rights votes1 in the MDBs after the passage of the IFI act and
found a distinct Cold War bias in the U.S. voting pattern. For example, during the first
Reagan administration a clear double standard emerged: the U.S. opposed loans going to
left-wing regimes and supported loans going to right-wing regimes with human rights
playing a muted role in voting decisions (Forsythe 1987). In other words, the early
research on the subject generally concluded that human rights did not constitute much of
a factor in U.S. voting decisions in the MDBs, especially when contrasted with security
interests. However, since this initial research on the subject the question has not been
addressed and there are several reasons for a re-evaluation at this time
First, Congress has recently taken a renewed interest in the operation of the
MDBs, including addressing the role of human rights in U.S. multilateral aid policy.
The IFI Act passed in 1977 represents just the first attempt by Congress to integrate
concern for human rights into voting decisions by the U.S. Currently there are fifteen
separate pieces of legislation that govern the issue including provisions requiring USEDs
to vote against proposed loans and grants to countries which violate their citizen’s rights
of religious freedom, fail to combat human trafficking, or fail to apprehend war criminals,
among other human rights issues. In addition, there has been legislation passed that
requires the USEDs to vote against loans going to specific countries for their ongoing
human rights violations. With the addition of these new legislative mandates over the
past thirty years it is important to see how they have influenced the voting record of the
U.S. in the MDBs subsequently.

1

I use the term “votes” to describe the U.S. position on each lending project but formal
votes are rarely taken in the MDBs. Projects are approved based on a consensus of the
members of the Executive Board.
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Second, recently the U.S. approach to foreign aid has been to emphasize
performance based lending, which stipulates that recipient countries should meet certain
policy requirements before receiving aid, and should also be rewarded with aid for
meeting those requirements (Babb 2009). The best expression of this approach is the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was established in 2004 during the Bush
administration. The MCA allows partnerships to develop between the U.S. and
developing countries for the delivery of foreign aid except that the recipient countries
have to meet certain selection criteria first before the partnership can begin. Human
rights, specifically political freedom, respect for civil liberties and respect for the rule of
law, are some of the selection criteria used by the MCA along with provisions on
transparency and good governance (Hook 2008).
Third, in 2004 the U.S. Congress mandated that the Treasury Department make
public its positions (yes, no, or abstain) on each proposal that is voted on by the MDBs.2
They are also required to give a reason as to why they voted no or abstained from voting
on each proposal they oppose. These “reason codes” primarily refer to the section of the
legislation that governs the vote in question and range from general economic
considerations to political concerns such as human rights, environmental protection, and
support for international terrorism among others. There are twenty-two separate reason
codes covering human rights. Some of the human rights reason codes are country
specific (Burma, Cambodia, Cuba, Serbia, and Zimbabwe) while others cover specific
types of human rights violations (war crimes, workers rights, female genital mutilation,
2

The IFI Act similarly required the Treasury Department to report to Congress on a
quarterly basis its votes in the MDBs. The practice was discontinued in the early 1990s
as the Treasury Department claimed that it had insufficient staff to meet the requirement
(Sanford 1997).
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and religious persecution). These are in addition to the general human rights provisions
of section 701 of the IFI Act. The recent publication of U.S. votes in the MDBs, along
with the reason codes indicating why the U.S. voted the way it did, provides a rich new
source of empirical content to analyze.
Fourth, as was mentioned, the earlier studies on human rights and U.S. voting
decisions in the MDBs were primarily done in the 1980s. These studies concluded that
there was a significant Cold War bias in U.S. voting and human rights did not constitute a
significant factor in U.S. voting decisions. Research on human rights and bilateral aid
has also shown a significant Cold War bias in the distribution of aid during the Cold War.
However, the research also shows that after the Cold War human rights considerations
became more prominent in the distribution of bilateral aid (Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and
Moskowitz 2009; Blanton and Cingranelli 2010). These bilateral aid findings provide
additional impetus for revisiting the question of how human rights influence U.S. voting
decisions in the MDBs since this same post Cold War pattern may also be visible in U.S.
multilateral aid decisions.
Finally, there have been significant methodological advancements since the
original research on the role of human rights in U.S. MDB voting decisions appeared.
Much of that original research consisted of simple correlations between a single human
rights measure and U.S. votes, which did not take into consideration additional
independent variables or particular contexts in which human rights might matter.
Additionally, there have been significant advancements in the development of human
rights measures since the earlier research was published. Much of the original research
used Freedom House scores that only measure respect for civil and political rights,
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however since then various new measures have been developed. For example, The
Political Terror Scale (PTS), which measures violations of rights of personal integrity in a
state using both State Department country reports and reports from Amnesty
International, provides an additional measure of human rights violations not captured by
the Freedom House measures (Wood and Gibney 2010).

Contribution
The main research question addressed in this study is to what extent are U.S.
votes in the MDBs conditioned on recipient countries respect for human rights? Also,
what rights does the U.S. promote in the MDBs and which countries does the U.S. chose
to sanction for their human rights record. This dissertation will address these questions
through an analysis of U.S. voting behavior in the MDBs. First through a multivariate
analysis that will determine how human rights influence U.S. votes compared to how
other foreign policy goals such as supporting allies and promoting domestic economic
prosperity determine U.S. votes. Secondly, through an analysis of the reason codes to
identify which rights the U.S. promotes and which countries it sanctions for its human
rights record.
The multivariate analysis places concern for human rights among other important
foreign policy concerns, specifically ensuring national security and promoting domestic
economic prosperity. In broader terms this places normative concerns, promoting human
rights, among strategic concerns, ensuring national security and promoting domestic
economic prosperity. The usefulness of this approach is that it does not treat promoting
human rights and pursuing strategic interests as mutually exclusive but rather as
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“sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting objectives.” (Rosenblum and
Salehyan 2004: 681). In reality these factors are not mutually exclusive and are instead
often reinforcing. There is an inherent difficulty in separating interests and values when
dealing with U.S. foreign policy as they are often intertwined. Additionally, there is
often a strategic dimension to policies that are thought of as based primarily on values.
For example, in the 2002 National Security Strategy the Bush administration outlined
global development as the third pillar of its approach to national security thus making the
connection that helping poor people out of poverty is vital to U.S. national security
(National Security Council 2002).
Countries can be placed on both axes (human rights and strategic interest) to
determine whether the U.S. will vote against their proposals in the MDBs. Countries that
have a good human rights record and are strategically important to the U.S. will receive
support and countries that have a poor human rights record and are not strategically
important to the U.S. will not receive U.S. support. The interesting source of variation
will come from countries that have a poor human rights record but are strategically
important to the U.S., and conversely those countries with good human rights records but
are not strategically important to the U.S.
Strategic interests broach a whole host of national security and economic issues.
From the national security perspective strategic interests include everything from specific
matters such as financing reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan for example, to
broad grand strategy themes such as containing the spread of communism, or as a means
of controlling and preventing transnational terrorism. In this dissertation, the foreign
policy goal of ensuring national security is conceptualized as support for allies (whether
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formal or informal). More specifically, support for allies in this dissertation contains two
measures—reception of military aid and voting affinity in the UN General Assembly.
Both measures are indicators of formal or informal allies in that countries that receive
military aid from the U.S. can be considered military allies and countries that have a
close voting affinity with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly can be considered
political allies with the U.S. From the economic perspective strategic interests range
from the general, like promoting economic growth worldwide, to the national, such as
providing new markets for U.S. goods, to the parochial, such as ensuring procurement
contract for U.S. firms. In this dissertation, the foreign policy goal of promoting
domestic economic prosperity is operationalized as volume of trade between the U.S. and
recipient country.
Promoting human rights in U.S. foreign policy can be broken down into two
separate but related categories: political rights and rights of personal integrity. Political
rights encompass a whole range of rights including-- rights of free expression, and rights
associated with the practice of democracy such as the right to vote and participate in the
political process. Rights of personal integrity also encompass a wide range of specific
rights including-- prohibitions against torture and cruel and inhumane punishment, as
well as prohibitions against slavery and forced labor, and finally prohibitions against
arbitrary detention and arrest (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). Both of these categories of
rights are well grounded in international documents such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(1966); not to mention that many of these rights are found in the foundational documents
of the United States, namely the U.S. Constitution.
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The reason code analysis is a more in depth examination of the U.S. voting record
in the MDBs. Specifically, it will examine when the U.S. voted against proposals in the
MDBs, against which countries, and for what reasons (e.g. human rights). There are 64
reason codes that correspond to legislative mandates that require the USED to use their
“voice and vote” to steer policy in the MDBs. Depending on the wording of the
legislation, and subsequent directives in committee reports, the leeway of the USEDs
(and by extension the Treasury Department and other Executive Branch agencies
involved in U.S. MDB policymaking) to vote a particular way can vary. When a reason
code is applied it is a signal that the USED is voting that way because of a specific
legislative mandate. Or in other words, the reason code represents the primary legislative
grounds on which the voting decision was based. The reason code analysis provides the
primary evidence for determining which rights the U.S. promotes in the MDBs and which
countries the U.S. chooses to sanction for their human rights record.
Finally, as an extension of the reason code analysis, this dissertation also includes
a case study of U.S. MDB voting decisions regarding China. Each loan proposal that the
U.S. has to vote on is analyzed first through an inter-agency process led by the Treasury
Department. It is through this process by which decisions are made as to whether the
U.S. should vote yes or no (or abstain) on loan projects, and if they decide to vote no (or
abstain) then for what reason? The case study will examine how the voting decisions
were made regarding China and how both strategic interests and human rights influenced
those decisions. The reason for focusing on China is twofold. First, relations with China
for the U.S. have significant security and economic aspects. China is one of the U.S.’s
main strategic rivals and economically speaking, China and the U.S. are heavily
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dependent on one another for economic benefits with China being maybe the most
important economic partner of the U.S. In terms of trade volume between the United
States and China, from 2004-2009 level of trade between the two countries averaged
$338 billion.

Secondly, China accounts for a large percentage of projects in both the

World Bank and Asian Development Bank and also accounts for over half of the
no/abstain votes from the U.S. so understanding the reason for that is particularly
important.
Rhetorically the US is an advocate for the universal application of human rights
standards. In practice, however, the US has shown bias in its promotion of certain rights
over others, and in criticizing the human rights records of certain states and not other
states with equivalent human rights practices (Koh 2005). One assumption is that
countries with close strategic ties to the U.S. will be exempt from criticism, or at least be
subject to weaker forms of criticism, from the US for their human rights practices.
During the Cold War this type of bias was evident in both multilateral and bilateral aid
contexts (Schoultz 1982; Meernik, Krueger, Poe 1998). In the post Cold War
environment human rights have become somewhat more prominent in the allocation of
US bilateral aid (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). Whether this same pattern is
evident in current US policy in the MDBs is something that this dissertation will address.

Limitations
There are some important limitations in this study. The main limitation is that the
voting record only reflects the US position on projects that have come before the
Executive Boards for formal approval. One cannot discern from the voting record the US
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position on projects that do not make it to the Executive Board for final approval, and
there is evidence to suggest that the US has considerable informal influence at the stages
before a loan proposal makes it to the Executive Board. It has been suggested that
proposals that the US would seriously disapprove of are stopped well before they get to
the Executive Board stage (Wade 2002, Woods 2003). In addition, several studies have
shown that the U.S. has been particularly successful in affecting MDB activities through
informal channels involving staffing decisions and choice of leadership (Babb 2009;
Andersen et al 2006; Woods 2003; Wade 2002). Finally, because of the consensus
decision-making requirement much of the politicking on decisions takes place before the
Executive Boards meet making it difficult to observe horse-trading and other political
dynamics that occur in all political bodies (Woods 2006).
Another limitation of relying on U.S. votes in the MDBs is that the U.S. does not
possess veto power over the distribution of loans/grants, so even if the U.S. votes against
a certain project there is a great chance that the project will still be approved. In most
cases the U.S. along with the other advanced democracies can muster enough voting
shares to veto a project however this is extremely rare. So in other words, once a project
has made it to the Executive Board it is almost impossible for the U.S. to prevent it from
being approved, which diminishes the impact a U.S. no vote may have. On the other
hand, “no” votes by the U.S. do send an important signal to other countries. State
Department officials in particular have expressed how important the signal is the U.S.
sends with its votes in the MDBs. One State Department official is quoted as stating,
“Other governments take U.S. votes as statements concerning their economic solvency or
probity, so these votes directly impinge on U.S. foreign policy.” (quoted in Sanford 2005:
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2). On the surface it may seem that a US “no” vote has little consequence for the
recipient country since they will almost certainly receive the loan anyway. A “no” vote,
especially when it is coupled with a reason code stating why the US voted no, has
diplomatic consequences and sends a signal to that country and others (including private
investors) of official U.S. disapproval.
A further limitation of this study is that it only considers how the U.S. uses it
“voice and vote” in the MDBs but not how the U.S. uses the “power of the purse” in
formulating policy towards the MDBs. The administration recommends MDB funding
levels to Congress through the budget process and Congress responds with legislation
authorizing and appropriating funding. Throughout the years Congress has attempted to
use the appropriation process as a means of leveraging policy changes in the MDBs
(Sanford 1978; 2001). An example of this can be seen in the authorization of funding for
MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), which is a member of the World
Bank group, in 1998. The authorizing legislation stated that no contribution could be
made to MIGA until it adopted U.S. proposed standards on worker’s rights and limit
insuring projects that directly competed with U.S. production (Sanford 2001). Although
the attempts by Congress to influence policy in the MDBs through the “power of the
purse” are important and give insight into how human rights may influence U.S. policy in
the MDBs, the exclusive focus on voting behavior used in this study is necessary to limit
the scope of the project. Also, recent attempts by Congress to use funding authorizations
to leverage policy changes in the MDBs have dealt with corruption and good governance
issues as opposed to human rights considerations.
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Plan for Rest of Dissertation
Chapter two contains the literature review, which is comprised of three main
sections. The first section contains a review of the literature on multilateralism and what
benefits states receive by operating through multilateral institutions. Multilateral aid
obviously differs from bilateral aid in that with the distribution of bilateral aid the U.S.
has full control over where funds are distributed and for what reasons. However, by
willingly operating in a multilateral setting the U.S. is conceding a significant amount of
control over how the resources it contributes will be used. Therefore it is necessary to
incorporate the reasons why the U.S. chooses to operate in international institutions into
any overall explanation for the place of human rights in U.S. multilateral aid policy.
The next sections of chapter two review the previous literature on human rights
and U.S. foreign policy in general and the literature on human rights and U.S. multilateral
aid policy and human rights and U.S. bilateral aid policy respectively. Much as human
rights are a variable component of U.S. foreign policy in general, the same can be said of
their place in both U.S. multilateral and bilateral aid policy. The majority of the literature
on human rights in U.S. MDB policy focused on the 1970s and 1980s after the passage of
the IFI Act and focused on how it has been implemented. In general, these studies find
that the U.S. exhibited a bias in the implementation of the IFI act by not voting against
loans that were going to allies that violated human rights, but voting against loans that
went to adversaries that had similar human rights records. The main drawback of this
literature is that it exclusively focuses on the period following the passage of the IFI act
(late 1970s-1980s) so the analysis is heavily colored by the Cold War paradigm.
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This issue is mitigated to a certain degree by looking at the literature on human
rights in U.S. bilateral aid policy. This literature is much more extensive and wideranging and, more importantly, covers the Cold War era and the post Cold War era. One
of the significant findings of this literature is that the promotion of human rights has
become somewhat more universal in the post Cold War era, i.e., the favoritism showed to
U.S. allies on their human rights record dissipated somewhat. Additionally, this literature
provides a more nuanced explanation of the place of human rights in U.S. bilateral aid
policy. It shows that factors such as the level of economic development of the recipient
country, or the type of government regime the recipient country also have to be factored
into the equation when determining how human rights influence aid decisions.
The final section describes the background, organization, lending activity, and
decision-making process of the MDBs. The MDBs are sister organizations, in that they
are separate institutions but also have the same basic structure and purpose. The MDBs
all serve the same essential purpose – the alleviation of poverty through the financing of
development projects in poor countries. The World Bank is the largest of the MDBs in
terms of lending capability with the four regional banks – the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the African
Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) serving a smaller role. Each MDB has a Board of Executive
Directors that makes the decision on whether to approve any particular loan or grant
package. A majority consensus among members of the Executive Board is required for
approval of any proposal. This process of seeking majority consensus opens the door for
politics to enter into the process and that opens the MDBs to U.S. influence.
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Chapter three contains the multivariate analysis. The chapter is broken down into
two main sections: research design and results. The research design section includes the
theoretical framework, hypothesis, data, and methodology. The theoretical framework
utilized argues that US foreign policy is the result of an interaction between normative
(i.e. promoting human rights) and strategic elements (i.e. ensuring national security and
promoting domestic economic prosperity). U.S. support for proposals in the MDBs
depends on where a state is located along these two axes. The usefulness of the model is
that it does not treat promoting human rights and pursuing strategic interests as mutually
exclusive. The hypothesis section lays out five hypothesis that test the relationships
between the independent variables of human rights, national security, economic
importance, and economic development and the dependent variable of U.S. votes in the
MDBs. More specifically I hypothesize that the U.S. will vote against countries that
violate both political rights and rights of personal integrity. As far as strategic interests
are concerned, I hypothesize that the U.S. will not vote against its allies, nor vote against
countries it considers to be economically important. Finally, I hypothesize that the U.S.
will not vote against poorer countries (relatively speaking) in the MDBs.
The data section describes in detail the parameters of the U.S. MDB voting
record, which is the primary data source for this dissertation. The U.S. voting record in
this study spans from 2004-2009 and includes 9,766 country year observations. The
voting record includes a brief description of the projects, which Bank and Lending
Window it was brought before, the date it was voted on, the amount of the loan, how the
U.S. voted on the proposal (yes, no, abstain), and a reason code. The overall voting
record is heavily skewed towards yes votes, with the U.S. voting to approve projects
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around 87% of the time. Finally, the methodology section describes the logistic
regression technique used to test the main hypotheses. The results section of Chapter 3
contains the main empirical findings. In addition to descriptive statistics this section also
includes a presentation and discussion of the results from the logistic regression model.
Additionally, results for the effect of human rights on predicted values are also presented.
Two further tests are then presented to determine exactly the influence of human rights
on U.S. MDB voting decisions. The first is a test of the model with the worst human
rights (political) abusing states removed. This is to test how much influence those
countries have on U.S. voting decisions. The second test is a test of the model with
proposals brought by China removed. This was done to test whether the influence on
human rights in determining U.S. votes in the MDBs was simply the result of a large
number of proposals brought forth by China.
Chapter four contains the reason code analysis. This chapter is comprised of four
main sections. The chapter begins by describing the U.S. MDB voting decision process
of which the reason codes are a product. There is an inter-agency process involving the
Treasury, State, Commerce and other federal government agencies, which reviews every
project proposal that comes before the Executive Board at each Bank. They then provide
directives to the USED on how to vote on each of those proposals. This section will
describe this process in detail. The second section describes and categorizes the
legislation which the reason codes reference. The top reason codes are broken down into
four categories – human rights, transparency, environment, and economics. Human
rights are the most prominent category in terms of frequency of application and in the
number of reason codes included in the category (22). The human rights category itself
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can be further refined into three separate sections – general human rights, specific human
rights violations, and country specific legislation.
The following section examines the application of the reason codes. Specifically
a breakdown of the use of human rights reason codes, including, which codes appear
more frequently than others, which countries have codes applied to them more frequently
than others, and which specific human rights violations are targeted over others. Finally,
this chapter will also contain a case study on China, and describe how and why the U.S.
voted on proposals for China and whether, and in what ways, human rights offer any
explanatory power in describing the voting decisions.
Chapter five consists of the conclusion to the dissertation. This conclusion puts
the empirical findings presented in Chapters three and four in the larger context of U.S.
foreign policy. Specifically, this section will look at the place of human rights in U.S.
MDB policy as compared to U.S. bilateral aid policy and in the even larger circumstance
of U.S. human rights policy in general. The concluding chapter also includes a section on
further areas of research and finally a section on the normative implications of this
dissertation and to what extent human rights should be a part of U.S. foreign policy in the
MDBs
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Why Multilateralism?
This chapter is broken down into three sections; the first contains a review of the
literature on multilateralism and why states pursue policies through multilateral means.
The second section contains a review of the relevant literature on human rights and U.S.
foreign policy in general, and U.S. multilateral aid policy and human rights and U.S.
bilateral aid policy in particular. Finally, the last section provides extensive background
on the multilateral development banks (MDBs) including their major functions, historical
background, lending practices, organization and decision-making procedures.
In any study on multilateral institutions an important point to consider is what
benefits do states like the United States derive from multilateralism and what effect do
those benefits have on U.S. policy in multilateral institutions? This is an important
consideration since by definition operating through any multilateral institutions requires
states to give up some control over policy. John Ruggie (1992: 568) defines
multilateralism as, “coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with
certain principles.” These principles orientate particular actions for participants that do
not heed reference to the specific needs of each individual participant. James Caporaso
(1992: 602) claims that multilateralism is differentiated from other forms of organization
by three factors, “indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse
reciprocity.” In other words, multilateralism is a form of organization that is
characterized by rules that proscribe state action for mutual long-term benefit. Ruggie
(1992) points out that the concept of “most favored nation” is a particular example of
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multilateralism since under its rules it treats countries that produce the same product the
same. In addition, multilateral institutions (such as the MDBs) are differentiated from
international orders or regimes because they have formal voting, or consensus, rules
which embody the principles of the institution (Ruggie 1992).
The standard neoliberal explanation for the usefulness of multilateral
organizations is that they facilitate cooperation between states by reducing transaction
costs and providing a forum where states interact with one another on a regular basis,
which increases the likelihood of cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).
Additionally, multilateral organizations allow states to pursue common goals by virtue of
their centralization and independence. Centralization facilitates collective action to
achieve these common goals while independence allows the institution to pursue these
common goals without the dictates from individual states that may hamper collective
action (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Finally, once institutions have been established they
tend to take on a life of their own as states have become invested in their continual
operation (Keohane 1984). An alternative realist viewpoint is that international
institutions simply reflect the underlying power realities of the international system and
are oriented to support the dominant states (Mearsheimer 1994/1995).
The social constructivist argument for the benefits of multilateral organizations is
that they operate as carriers and distributers of international norms (Finnemore 1993;
Finnemore 1996, Checkel 1998). For example, as Finnemore (1993) points out states
adopted science policy bureaucracies because international organizations, particularly
UNESCO, promoted them. Of course, constructivists also contend that IOs, because of
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their autonomy and independent sources of power, often change in ways states did not
anticipate or ask for (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
With regards to foreign aid, Rodrik (1995) argues that there are two primary
benefits of multilateralism for donor states. One of the benefits is that multilateral aid
institutions are better at monitoring the countries that receive aid and therefore better
positioned to ensure that the aid is being used for its intended purpose. Second,
multilateral institutions are also in a better position to impose conditions on the reception
of aid. Because donors pool their aid together and distribute it through one institution
recipient countries are prevented from playing donor countries against one another for
more aid or favorable lending conditions (Rodrik 1995).
Helen Milner (2006) argues that the decision by donor states to distribute aid
through multilateral institutions is the result of different preferences between donor
governments and their publics. Whereas donor governments see aid primarily as a
vehicle to further their political and/or economic foreign policy goals, their publics see
aid as a way to help out those in need. Therefore they see multilateral agencies as better
able to fulfill those needs than their own governments. Milner concludes that when
donor country publics are more skeptical of bilateral aid, states give more aid through
multilateral institutions (Milner 2006).
For what benefits, or to serve what ends, then does the U.S. choose to channel a
measure of its foreign aid through multilateral institutions? The question is relevant
because as the hegemonic state the U.S. is giving up a significant measure of autonomy
to allow its resources to be distributed by a multilateral body, which it does not have
complete control over. Ikenberry (2001; 2003) argues that the U.S. pursued a strategy of
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building multilateral institutions after World War II in an effort to “lock in” other states
into an international order that is inherently favorable to the U.S. In essence the U.S. was
willing to give up some of its sovereignty to multilateral institutions to create an
institutionalized international order that serves its long-term interests. This is preferable,
and less costly, for the hegemon as compared to operating in a system of free-floating
alliances and loose connections between states (Ikenberry 2003). An additional benefit
the U.S. receives from operating multilaterally is international legitimacy. The strategic
restraint argument offered by Ikenberry (2001) posits that a hegemonic state like the U.S.
purposefully binds itself to institutions in an effort to entice other states to follow. This
leads to a more stable international order, which benefits the dominant state. This
process of placing self-imposed limits on oneself give the United States a measure of
legitimacy which helps maintain its hegemonic status (Rapkin and Braaten 2009).
In addition to benefits like legitimacy and a more beneficial international order
there are other benefits the U.S. receives from operating in multilateral organizations
such as the MDBs. As was mentioned earlier the main benefits of international
organizations is they help correct market failures by reducing transaction costs, providing
a forum where information is shared, and institutionalizes reciprocity to prevent cheating
(Keohane and Martin 1995). The U.S. sees the MDBs as beneficial institutions that help
further U.S. foreign policy goals by getting other states to help achieve them. For
example, Milner and Tingley (2010) suggest that support for multilateral aid from the
American public derives from notions of burden-sharing and cost control. Americans
tend to support multilateralism, to the extent that they do, because they think it “will be
cheaper than unilateralism in the long run.” (Lake 1999: 220)
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Another way of looking at why the U.S. would cede some of its sovereignty to
join international organizations is because in practice it does not actually give up much
sovereignty. Or in other words, since the U.S. exercises considerable influence in
international organizations it can influence the policies that IOs pursue. There is a
considerable literature that argues that international organizations often serve U.S.
foreign policy goals, or at a minimum that the U.S. exercises extensive influence in
determining outcomes in international institutions. For example, when the study of
international organizations started to become more commonplace, early critics pointed
out that these institutions did not offer the cooperative benefits that supporters claimed
and that these institutions actually served as foreign policy tools of the dominant states
(Strange 1983).
With specific reference to the MDBs there has been a recent swell of literature,
which argues that decisions made by these institutions are often in line with U.S. policy.
For example, Fleck and Kilby (2006) have found that U.S. commercial interests influence
the geographical distribution of World Bank loans and that U.S. influence in the World
Bank varies across presidential administrations. In a follow up study Kilby (2006),
focusing on the influence of Japan and the United States on the distribution of lending by
the Asian Development Bank, found that both American and Japanese political factors
influence ADB lending more than humanitarian concerns, and that donor interests
influence lending more in the ADB than in the World Bank. In another study, Andersen
et al. (2005) used voting similarity in the United Nations General Assembly as a proxy
variable in determining a country’s relationship (ally or enemy) with the United States
and compared that with the dollar amount of World Bank loans that country received.
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They found a statistically significant relationship indicating that the U.S. is able to
influence the lending patterns of the World Bank.
These quantitative studies are backed up by more qualitatively oriented studies,
which tend to focus on the informal influence the U.S. wields in the MDBs. For instance,
Robert Wade (2002) argues that in the World Bank the U.S. exercises considerable
control over prominent staffing decisions, not least of which is the President, therefore
ensuring that people in charge of directing policy will be aligned with U.S. interests.
McKeown (2009) also finds on U.S. control of multilateral institutions that:
[U.S.] Government officials appear to have viewed the difference between their
formal authority when acting unilaterally and acting through a multilateral
organization as typically of little practical consequence, because in neither
situation did they view the formal rules as the binding constraint. Thus, when the
formal rules of an organization suggest that wealthy and influential national
governments have delegated substantial decision-making authority to it, this
might be because national governments expect that their informal means of
control will prevent “free wheeling” by their own delegations and others (275).
In effect, the U.S. makes up for the restraint in autonomy that the formal rules of
international organizations place upon it through informal influence. Woods (2003) also
focuses on the informal influence the U.S. exercises in MDBs such as the World Bank,
noting that during the project development stage U.S. approval is sought, and projects in
which the U.S. would strongly object to do not get past this stage. Woods (2000)
however argues that the U.S. cannot, and does not, completely dominate the World Bank
policymaking process. The reason is the U.S. needs the World Bank to help achieve
objectives that it cannot achieve on its own such as encouraging trade liberalization and
better governance in developing countries.
In summary, the U.S. operates in multilateral organizations such as the MDBs
because they help achieve common goals, which the U.S. either cannot, or are too
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expensive to, achieve on its own. Also the U.S. as the hegemonic state has reaped
legitimacy benefits by constraining itself in multilateral institutions. Finally, the major
downside of multilateralism for individual states is that it restricts autonomy and range of
action, but the U.S. through its exercise of informal influence is largely able to make up
for those restrictions in the MDBs. The next issue to consider is exactly what are U.S.
preferences in regards to foreign aid and human rights. The next section looks at
previous work on the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy and in particular with
regards to multilateral and bilateral aid.

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy
The place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy has been described as
“paradoxical” (Apodaca 2006), a “bait and switch” (Mertus 2004), and as “permanent but
ambivalent” (Forsythe 2002). What these phrases convey is that the promotion of human
rights by the U.S. has been inconsistent in both form and content. On the one hand the
U.S. has been exceptional in its promotion of human rights abroad and led the way
among developed democratic governments in making human rights an important
component of its foreign policy. This process began with an assertive Congress in the
mid 1970s, passing numerous laws making human rights a factor in a number of foreign
policy decisions, including the distribution of foreign aid (Blanton and Cingranelli
2010). The foreign policy issues in which the human rights practices of targeted states
have been considered by the U.S. include: the distribution of multilateral and bilateral
economic aid, the distribution of military aid (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe
1992; Poe and Meernik 1995), arm sales (Blanton 2000; Blanton 2005), trade agreements
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(Hafner-Burton 2009), economic sanctions (Drury and Li 2006) and asylum policy
(Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004) among other issue areas. As Harold Koh (2005: 119)
has claimed: “to this day, the United States remains the only superpower capable, and at
times, willing, to commit real resources and make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and
drive an international system committed to international law, democracy, and the
promotion of human rights.” On the other hand, as Koh also points out, the U.S. applies
a double standard on human rights, not only applying different rules to itself than it does
to the rest of the world, but also by holding its allies to different standards on human
rights than its enemies. In other words the U.S. often claims to represent universal
standards in human rights, but in practice it often does not live up to those standards.
The reality is that no state can make human rights its only foreign policy priority,
additional issues such as upholding national security, strengthening economic relations,
and supporting development are objectives that states seek that may be incompatible with
supporting human rights in certain situations (Baehr 2009). The tension between the
various foreign policy goals the U.S. pursues can be conceived as a difference between
pursuing normative goals (promoting human rights) and strategic or material goals
(upholding national security, strengthening economic relations) (Rosenblum and
Salehyan 2004). More broadly, this difference is essentially a distinction between
liberalism and realism in U.S. foreign policy.
Promoting human rights is not often associated with promoting the material well
being of a country like upholding national security and strengthening economic relations
are, though it can be argued that promoting human rights can have long-term benefits for
liberal democracies such as the U.S. (Schultz 2002). Promoting human rights is often
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seen as an expression of morality in foreign policy as opposed to promotion of the
national interest, which includes pursuing strategic and material goals (Baehr 2009).
Foreign policy realists posit that morality should be subordinated to promoting the
national interest in a state’s foreign policy, or they often conflate morality with promoting
the national interest. This viewpoint is best seen in the work of Henry Kissinger (1994),
who argues that U.S. foreign policy should promote stability and that the logic of the
balance of power requires states to promote their material interests ahead of morality.
Foreign policy liberalism, on the other hand, takes the promotion of human rights norms
as an equally important component of foreign policy as ensuring national security and
promoting domestic economic prosperity. With regards to the U.S. this takes on two
forms. One form is an absolutist position in which the U.S. (and all states) should have
an unwavering support for promoting human rights abroad and should be itself subject to
international standards on human rights. This cosmopolitan viewpoint is best seen in the
early years of the Carter administration where human rights were considered a
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy (Forsythe 2011). The other viewpoint is American
exceptionalism, which views the U.S. as a special nation engaged in an experiment in
personal liberty. This belief can lead to a viewpoint that since America is exceptional it
has a mandate to spread norms of personal liberty abroad. It can also lead to an opposing
view that because the U.S. is exceptional it should simply focus on cultivating personal
liberty at home (Forsythe 2006; 2011). These tensions in the overall orientation of U.S.
foreign policy have lead to inconsistencies in promoting human rights as they proscribe
oppositional policies for any particular situation the U.S. may find itself in.
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U.S. inconsistency in supporting human rights is therefore not surprising, but the
interesting question is how important are human rights in U.S. foreign policy generally
and more specifically in what context do human rights matter in U.S. foreign policy?
Foreign aid, whether delivered through multilateral institutions or bilaterally, is a
mechanism through which the U.S. can achieve its foreign policy goals. Therefore,
studying the distribution of U.S. bilateral aid, or in the case of this dissertation U.S. votes
in the MDBs one can examine how the multiple foreign policy goals are reflected in the
outcomes and what relative attention each goal receives.

Human Rights and U.S. Multilateral Aid Policy
There is considerable research on the question of whether human rights are a
significant determinant of MDB loans (Neumayer 2003a; Neumayer 2003b; Lebovic and
Voeten 2009) and whether MDB loans and structural adjustment programs are
detrimental to human rights (Abouhard and Cingranelli 2006; Abouhard and Cingranelli
2008; Eriksen and de Soysa 2009). For example, Abouhard and Cingranelli (2008) find
that the structural adjustment conditions that are attached to World Bank (and IMF) loans
have had a negative influence on human rights. The structural adjustment policies often
require governments to reduce social welfare spending and that tends to invoke public
backlash, which is then often put down violently by the governments in questions. Mac
Darrow (2003) also notes that the World Bank, despite its insistence that it is a nonpolitical institution, has let its lending policies steadily encroach upon issues that impact
human rights such as combating HIV/AIDS, combating child labor, and promoting good
governance.
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Research on whether human rights influence U.S. policy in the MDBs however
has not been as prevalent. With the general interest in human rights developing in both
Congress and the Carter administration in the 1970s, and with the passage of the IFI act
in 1977, there was an initial surge of attention in the question of human rights in U.S.
multilateral aid policy, but it has not received sustained attention since the 1980s. The
original research into the question generally concluded that human rights took a back seat
to geopolitical concerns during the Cold War.
According to Elizabeth Spiro (1977) U.S. human rights policy regarding
multilateral aid consists of using bilateral tactics within a multilateral environment. Two
specific tactics in particular stand out: first trying to create a human rights coalition
among other like-minded countries willing to deny loans for human rights reasons, and;
second pursuing a human rights policy that also serves the economic and geopolitical
interests of the United States. Jonathan Sanford (1982) points out, however, that from the
period of 1977 (when the IFI act went into effect) to 1981 there is no discernible evidence
that abstentions and no votes by the U.S. for human rights reasons effected lending to
specific countries. He does note, however, that as a signaling mechanism U.S. no votes
can have an impact. In addition, he points out that the votes painted a somewhat
inconsistent picture as the decision to vote against certain loan proposals stemmed not so
much from the human rights record of the recipient country as from its ideological
orientation (anti-Communist vs. pro-Communist) (Sanford 1982).
Lars Schoultz (1982) also examined U.S. votes in the MDBs during the same time
period and found that human rights were one of the main reasons the U.S. voted no on
particular loans (although no votes overall were quite rare). But he also points out how
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the no votes cast ostensibly for human rights reasons also had a distinct ideological
dimension as well. In addition, Schoultz (1982) points out the overwhelming presence of
Latin American countries that were singled out by the U.S. for their poor human rights
records with Argentina receiving one-fourth of all opposing votes.
In a survey that spanned the Carter administration as well as the first Reagan
administration, David Forsythe (1988) argued that although the Carter administration was
not enthusiastic about section 701 of the IFI act, viewing it as a constraint on Executive
authority, it did vote against numerous loans in the MDBs on human rights grounds.
During the first Reagan administration however a double standard emerged from using
the provision primarily against certain left-wing governments while voting for loans to
right wing or authoritarian governments (Forsythe 1988). Glenn Mower Jr. (1987) finds
a similar pattern in both the Carter and Reagan administrations. He also notes that
Congress amended language to section 701 to remove the word “consistent” from the
legislation making it more difficult for the Reagan administration to justify its votes by
arguing that those regime were not engaged in consistent pattern of human rights
violations (Mower Jr. 1987). In summary, this brief literature points out that U.S. votes
against loans for human rights reasons had a distinct Cold War bias in that the recipient
state’s ideology as well as its relationship with the U.S. appears to be the primary reasons
for the no votes, with human rights a secondary concern.

Human Rights and U.S. Bilateral Aid
One limitation of this literature review is that all of the works under review
examine the time period from 1977 to the late 1980s and primarily rely on descriptive
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statistics without testing the full array of variables that may determine U.S. votes in the
MDBs. In contrast to the thin literature on U.S. human rights policy and multilateral aid
there is an extensive literature on the place of human rights in U.S. bilateral aid. An
overview of this literature focusing specifically on the post-Cold War era supplies
additional variables that enable a more fully specified overall test of the place of human
rights in recent U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs.
Meernik et. al’s (1998) expansive study suggests that three broad factors govern
the distribution of foreign aid. The first are systemic factors, which primarily encompass
national security concerns. The second are societal factors that include liberal economic
and free market policies driven by domestic business interests. The third category
includes ideological concerns regarding democracy promotion, human rights, and
development. They conclude that since the end of the Cold War security factors have
declined in importance while ideological concerns have increased in importance.
Specifically they found that human rights were significant in determining whether a
country received aid from the U.S. However, for those countries that did receive aid,
those countries with worse human rights records tended to receive a greater amount of aid
than those countries with better human rights records. They speculate that once a country
passes some basic minimum standard of human rights protection they are not punished
for the less severe violations they may commit (Meernik et. al. 1998).
Apodaca and Stohl (1999) expanded the scope of previous works on U.S. aid and
human rights by including a larger sample of countries (140) and also by examining the
Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations in addition to the Carter and Reagan
administrations. They found that at the gatekeeping stage (the initial stage at which it is
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decided whether a country receives aid or not) human rights did matter for whether a
country received U.S. aid or not, except during the Clinton administration. In addition,
human rights were important in determining the amount of aid a country received countries with awful human rights records (as measured by respect for rights of personal
integrity) received less aid. Despite the positive assessment of the role human rights
played in the distribution of U.S. economic aid, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) also found that
national security interests (defined by US military presence) played a greater role, with
countries viewed as important to U.S. national security receiving aid despite their record
on human rights.
More recent scholarship on the question of human rights and U.S. bilateral aid has
become more complex both substantively and methodologically. Lai (2003) for instance
focuses on the gate keeping stage of bilateral aid by looking at the initial disbursement of
aid as opposed to who receives aid each year. He found human rights only predicted the
initial amount of aid a state was allocated and this was only significant after the Cold War
(Lai, 2003). The most recent scholarship posits that the influence of human rights on
bilateral aid decisions is dependent on both the regime type of the recipient country and
its level of economic development (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz, 2009). Specifically,
they find that human rights are not an important determinant of U.S. aid for countries
transitioning to democracy or established democracies, nor are they an important
determinant for economically underdeveloped countries as measured by GDP per capita.
They did find that human rights are an important determinant of aid going to autocracies,
with autocracies that have poor human rights records receiving less aid (Demirel-Pegg
and Moskowitz 2009).
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From the literature review one can see that over time human rights have been an
important but uneven component of U.S. foreign aid policy, becoming more of a factor in
the post-Cold War environment. More specifically, what these studies show is that
economic and security concerns often take priority over human rights norms as a
determinant of aid. The shift in the international security environment away from
bipolarity after the Cold War has somewhat changed the content of those priorities, as
well as their importance. The next issue to consider is exactly what the MDBs do and
how they operate. The next section looks at how the MDBs are organized and how the
operate with particular reference to the role the U.S. plays in MDB operations.

Overview of MDBs:
Multilateral development banks are international institutions comprised of
member states and dedicated to the alleviation of poverty through the financing of
development projects in poor countries. Towards that end the MDBs generally engage in
three types of activities. First, their traditional activity is providing financing for largescale investment projects that are deemed important for development. Originally, much
of this investment focused on large infrastructure projects such as transportation, utilities
and communication. The emphasis during this time was on physical assets that would
generate recoverable revenue making the projects self-liquidating (Kapur et. al. 1997).
Later on the mandate of the MDBs expanded, starting with the World Bank, and the
investment strategy grew broader and carried a specific poverty reduction focus (Sanford
1982). In the last decade or so the MDBs lending portfolio has shifted towards social
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development projects – health, education, creation of social safety net – over traditional
infrastructure investments (Lyne et. al 2009).
Second, the MDBs also provide loans for policy reforms. These are non-project
loans with conditions attached that provides governments with financing in exchange for
specific domestic policy reforms. Policy-based lending emerged in the MDBs for three
reasons. First, as a response to the debt crisis, and second oil crisis, which required
substantial and fast lending. Second, in response to mounting evidence that a recipient
country’s governing and policy environment was critical to the success of development
projects and in an attempt to induce change in borrowing countries, the MDBs started to
offer these conditional loans. Finally, the fungibility of money lent to recipient countries
necessitated the evaluation of a countries total investment program (Williamson 2005).
This was done in an attempt to ensure some measure of accountability for the money that
was lent to borrowing states. The funds for these projects are usually distributed in
installments to ensure that governments are complying with the attached conditions. The
most controversial non-project lending program is the World Bank’s Structural
Adjustment Facility since it promotes market liberalization and the privatization of
services in borrowing countries (Babb 2009). In fact research suggests that World Bank
structural adjustment lending has actually worsened the human rights situation in
recipient states since the conditions attached to the loans require reductions in public
expenditures that hurt the poor leading to increased social conflict and inviting harsh
government responses to quell the unrest (Abouhard and Cingranelli 2006).
Finally, the MDBs also conduct and disseminate research on development. This
is especially true for the World Bank, which produces a large quantity of scholarly
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research on development every year; and this research is highly influential in both the
academic and development spheres (Babb 2009). World Bank research on development
informs the policies of bilateral development agencies and the lending policies of the
World Bank itself, as well as the policies of the other MDBs (Babb 2009). Although the
development research conducted and disseminated by the MDBs, especially the World
Bank, is very influential it is not above criticism. For example, World Bank research has
been criticized for promulgating a neoliberal approach to development that reflects the
influence of the U.S. and the western economics training of its staff (Wade 2002; Weaver
2008).

MDBs: Background
There are five major development banks operating today. The World Bank,
founded in 1944, is by far the largest lender, distributing billions of dollars a year in lowinterest loans and grants to the poorest countries in the world. The World Bank was
established during the Bretton Woods conference along with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to plan the post World War II financial architecture. The original purpose of
the World Bank was to provide financing for the reconstruction of Europe but this was
subsequently supplanted when the U.S. took on that role with the Marshall Plan. The
World Bank then quickly shifted its focus towards economic development and poverty
reduction in the developing world. Over the years the organization has evolved to what is
known as the World Bank group, which includes a total of four lending windows
specializing in specific lending programs. In addition, the World Bank evolved from an
organization that focused on large-scale infrastructure investment projects, to an
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organization involved with a wide variety of investments including social and policy
lending, allowing the organization to slowly encroach upon the domestic politics of the
recipient countries.
In addition to the World Bank there are four regional banks. The Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) was established in 1959 to support economic development in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and is the longest serving regional development bank
in operation. In contrast to the World Bank, the IDB’s mandate from the beginning
included broad support for social lending and targeted assistance to the poor, and only
started to devote attention to large-scale infrastructure projects during the 1970s (Babb
2009). The U.S. initially resisted the creation of the IDB for several years but eventually
came to support the creation of the institution. Three broad factors helped push for its
creation. First, there was the motivation among Latin American countries to limit the
influence of foreigners in their economic affairs and to give themselves more authority
over their own economic development. Second, there was a belief that the World Bank,
and bilateral aid donors, who were devoting their resources to other regions of the world,
were slighting Latin American countries. The creation of the IDB was meant to rectify
this imbalance. Finally, Latin American countries were not in favor of the World Bank’s
approach to development with its emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects. They
favored, and wanted, social lending as well as concessional lending (Sanford 1982). One
of the unique features of the IDB when it was developed was its soft loan window, which
lends at a greatly reduced interest rate over a long period of time. Subsequent MDBs,
including the World Bank, developed soft loan windows as well but the IDB was the only
Bank that has included one since it’s founding. The IDB is also unique among the other
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regional development bank in that its headquarters are not located in its region but in
Washington D.C., which has lead to concerns that the IDB is subject to undue U.S.
influence (Strand 2003). However the borrowing states in the IDB have always exerted a
fair amount of influence in the organization (Tussie 1995).
The African Development Bank (AfDB) is located in Tunis, Tunisia and was
established in 1964. In contrast to the other development banks, the push to create the
institution came from African countries themselves and not wealthy donor states such as
the U.S. Initially the membership of the AfDB was limited to African states and
represented broad notions of pan-Africanism that were prevalent during the postcolonial
era after World War II. The AfDB was to represent “Africanicity” in its operations,
membership, and lending activities. This ideology had important symbolic meaning to
showcase an African institution that was successful and successfully run by Africans
themselves without western influence (Mingst 1990).
Closely following its founding the AfDB faced a financial shortfall. Because of
the poor economic performance in African at the time the AfDB’s creditworthiness
suffered and its bonds were unable to generate capital to lend. Because of this the AfDB
eventually opened its membership to wealthy donor states such as the U.S., which first
joined the AfDB’s concessional lending window and then a few years later joined the
hard loan window. In the mid-1990s the AfDB again faced financial problems as some
of the non-African members lost faith in the institution. One reason for this crisis was
that as some of the recipient country’s creditworthiness was declining they were still
receiving non-concessional loans. This led the AfDB into significant arrears and in 1994
the AfDB essentially shut down its lending operations. In an effort to differentiate itself
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in a crowded aid environment the AfDB has recently started to focus on those areas in
which it can be most effective, including infrastructure projects and leaving other issues,
such as AIDS policy, to different institutions such as the World Bank and the United
Nations (Weiss 2008).
The Asian Development Bank (AsDB) was established in 1965 and is
headquartered in Manila. Much like the other regional development banks the idea for
the AsDB emerged from the countries in the region. The U.S. was initially reluctant to
support the institution but quickly came around to supporting it as the war in Vietnam
started to escalate. In April 1965 President Johnson advocated for economic
development as a means to support peace in Southeast Asia and subsequently threw U.S.
support behind the creation of the AsDB. President Johnson’s advocacy of the AsDB
was meant to indicate continued U.S. engagement with the Vietnam War and signal that
the U.S. was determined to maintain long-term influence in the region (Sanford 1982;
Culpepper 1994).
The AsDB, much like the World Bank, originally focused on financing
infrastructure projects and later shifted to more broad based poverty reduction and
economic development strategies. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 drove the AsDB to
re-evaluate its role as many of its members were severely effected by the crisis including,
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. By the end of 1999 the AsDB
exclaimed that poverty reduction was its primary mission thereby establishing the shift in
lending priorities that had been developing over the past few decades (Weiss 2004). One
unique feature of the AsDB compared to the other MDBs is the equal influence of both
the United States and Japan. Japan was as influential as the U.S. in the creation of the
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AsDB and made an initial contribution that was equal to the U.S. contribution. The
AsDB was one of the first international institutions in which Japan asserted a leadership
role and has used the institution to achieve some international prestige (Strand 1999).
Also, friction between the two countries has been minimal in the institution as they both
broadly support the same goals for the institution (Babb 2009).
Finally, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was
established in 1991 to assist Eastern European countries transition from Communism.
The immediate post Communist era in Central and Eastern Europe was a time of rapid
political and social change. It was within this complex international environment that the
EBRD formed. Emerging from this distinct regional environment the EBRD gained an
explicitly political agenda to go along with its economic development agenda.
Specifically, its political agenda is to promote democracy in the former communist
countries of Eastern Europe (Strand 2003).
The political, and economic, agenda of the EBRD developed because the
institution is actually embedded in already established overlapping institutions in Europe,
such as the European Union and NATO. Steven Weber (1994: 34) describes the EBRD
as “the first self-consciously political and European international institution of the postCold War world, it represents an outward-looking partial alliance among states that share
a basic orientation toward democratic standards linked to commitments about the
principal role of market competition and ultimately the private-sector in economic and
political development.” Because of its unique origins the EBRD has five core
components to its mandate that distinguish it from the other MDBs. First, political
factors will greatly influence lending decisions. Second, the institution will work closely
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with private firms in financing projects. Third, the environmental impact of a project will
be factored into the lending decision. Fourth, the EBRD has tools at its disposal that
other MDBs do not, such as the ability to take an equity share, demand sovereign
guarantees, and underwrite security offerings. Finally, the Bank has a role in providing
advice to governments transitioning from Communism to Capitalism on privatization and
other economic issues (Weber 1994; Strand 2003).
More so than the other MDBs, The EBRD acts like a private bank in that it does a
lot of its lending to private interests. In fact, the EBRD does not have a soft loan window
– a institution that focuses on concessional lending, i.e., lending at almost zero interest
with a repayment term that spans decades. The U.S., and in particular the first Bush
Administration, wanted the EBRD to focus exclusively on private lending but that
proposal met with resistance from some European countries. The compromise was set to
allow only up to 40 percent of EBRD lending for traditional infrastructure and public
works lending, which is the bread and butter of the other MDBs (Babb 2009).

MDBs: Lending
The MDBs, and specifically the World Bank, are the primary source of
development assistance to the less developed countries of the world. Each of the MDBs,
excluding the EBRD, has at least two lending windows through which funds are
distributed (see Table 2.1 for full list of lending windows for each bank). The “hard
loan” windows are where loans are made at near market rates but with longer repayment
periods than are offered by commercial banks. The majority of MDB projects are
financed through the hard loan windows. The interest rates on projects financed through
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these windows are flexible but they usually vary by a half percentage more than what the
MDBs pay to get the funds originally. The repayment period is also variable depending
on the project and the institution making the loan but generally it varies from between 12
to 25 years (Sanford 2001a). One of the original purposes of the World Bank was to
mitigate imperfections in the world capital markets and channel funds to countries and
projects which were likely to have a high rate of return but were perceived as risky and
thus causing private capital to stay away (Upton 2000). The hard loan windows were
meant to remedy this problem.

Table 2.1 Multilateral Development Banks and Lending Windows
Bank

The World Bank Group

The African Development Bank

The Asian Development Bank

Window
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) – Hard Loan
Window
International Development Association
(IDA) – Soft Loan Window
International Finance Corporation (IFC) –
Private Sector Affiliate
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) – Export Insurance
Global Environment Facility (GEF) –
Environmental projects financing
African Development Bank (AfDB) – Hard
Loan Window
African Development Fund (AfDF) – Soft
Loan Window
Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) – Specific Soft
Loan Window
Asian Development Bank (AsDB) – Hard
Loan Window
Asian Development Fund (AsDF) – Soft
Loan Window
Ordinary Capital (OC) – Hard Loan
Window
Fund for Special Operations (FSO) – Soft
Loan Window
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The Inter-American Development Bank

The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development

Inter-American Investment Corporation
(IIC) – Private Sector Affiliate
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) –
Grant Facility
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) – Government and
Private Sector Hard Loan Window

The second type of lending windows are known as “soft loan” windows, which
lend at heavily subsidized, or concessional, rates to the poorest countries with repayment
terms of 40 years or more. As a result, concessional loans are not profitable for MDBs so
they have to rely on donor contributions to make up for the shortfall. This is in contrast
to hard loans, which have interest rates that allow the MDBs to recoup the loan. These
soft loan windows are perhaps better described as aid vehicles rather than lending
programs (Upton 2000). Not all member states of the MDBs are eligible for soft loan or
concessional lending. For example, the International Development Association (IDA) is
the soft loan facility of the World Bank, and eligibility for IDA lending depends
ultimately on a country’s relative poverty. Measuring a country’s gross national income
per capita and comparing it to an annual threshold, which in 2010 was $1,135, determines
eligibility. In 2010 seventy-nine countries were eligible for IDA resources (World Bank
2011).
In addition to these two basic lending windows, both the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank have separate windows for lending to private
enterprises in developing countries. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the
Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) are the main private sector windows in the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank respectively. This lending is done
primarily through the financing and equity investments in private sector enterprises and
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specifically in the case of the IIC in small and medium enterprises (USGAO 2001). The
IDB also has a second private sector lending window the Multilateral Investment Fund
(MIF), which was established in 1993 and specifically provides financing for
microenterprises and small businesses.
Although the hard loan windows of each MDB can also lend to the private sector
the majority of that lending goes to governments (except in the EBRD), which makes
these additional private sector windows useful. In addition, a private sector lending
window like the IFC can also provide financing for private sector projects without having
a government secure the investment, which is specifically prohibited in both the hard loan
and soft loan windows in the World Bank (Weaver 2008). The purpose of these lending
windows is to further economic growth through the development of the private sector.
The World Bank has an additional window for political risk insurance, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which provides insurance for foreign investment
in developing countries. Ultimately, like the IFC, the MIGA is meant to help channel
foreign capital to the developing world. The final component of the World Bank is the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is not a
lending window but a dispute settlement and arbitration agency used to help solve
investment disagreements (Weaver 2008).

MDBs: Organization
According to Sarah Babb (2009: 23), the MDBs are “members of a common
family and share family traits.” In other words, the MDBs are separate organizations but
they share many common characteristics especially when it comes to their organization

52
and decision-making structure. Despite the fact that all the MDBs share similar
characteristics the World Bank serves as kind of a leader among these institutions. Since
the World Bank was the first multilateral development bank the subsequent regional
development banks generally adopted the same organizational structure. Also, many of
the changes in lending patterns that have occurred throughout the MDBs (such as the
development of policy based lending) began with the World Bank and migrated to the
other MDBs.
The MDBs are staffed and run by international civil servants but the main
supervisory bodies of the MDBs - the Boards of Governors and the Boards of Executive
Directors -- represent member state governments. The Board of Governors is the senior
decision making body for each institution and they usually meet annually to develop an
overall strategic vision for the organization. Much of the decision-making of the Board
of Governors has been delegated to the Executive Boards, but the Board of Governors
still maintains control over major factors such as membership decisions, whether to
increase or decrease the capital stock, and whether to alter the Articles of Agreement. In
general, the Board of Governors bear responsibility for making decisions on the broad
scope of MDB operations (USGAO 2001).
The Executive Board is where the vast majority of decision-making occurs within
the MDBs. The members of the Executive Board, known as Executive Directors (ED),
serve a dual role in that they represent their member county but they also act as
international civil servants (Woods 2006). The Executive Board for each institution
usually meets on a weekly basis and makes decisions on lending and policy proposals. In
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addition, they also handle the general administrative and budgetary matters and oversee
general bank activity (USGAO 2001).
Member country representation differs for both the Board of Governors and the
Executive Boards. Each member country has a governor on the Board of Governors,
which is not the case with the Executive Boards. In the Executive Boards the most
economically important member states have their own EDs while the less powerful states
must share an ED. For example, in the World Bank countries such as the U.S., the U.K.,
Germany, and France have their own ED, while Mexico, Spain, Venezuela and other
Central American states share a single ED (Babb 2009). This requires an ED that
represents a group of countries to discern a consensus among the countries they represent
as to how to vote on specific issues. Generally speaking, each window of each MDB has
a separate Executive Board but often it is the same Executive Director who represents
each country or group of countries on the different boards. The number of EDs on each
board varies by institution (see Table 2.2 for number of EDs in each Bank)

Table 2.2 Executive Directors (2010)
Bank

Total # of
Executive
Directors

Regional
Members

Represent 2 or
more Countries

Represent one
country

5 (U.S., Japan,
Germany,
20 France, U.K.)

World Bank

25

NA

IDB

14

10

2 (U.S.,
12 Canada)

AsDB
AfDB

12
18

8
12

10 2 (U.S., Japan)
17 1 (U.S.)
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EBRD

23

8 (Italy,
France, EIB,
Japan, U.S.,
EU, U.K.,
15 Germany)

19

MDB: Decision Making
Both formal and informal procedures guide the decision-making process in the
Executive Board. The formal voting rules of the MDBs are generally the same with some
slight variation across each of the institutions. Voting rules were one of the major areas
of concern during the Bretton Woods negotiations that established the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Neither of these institutions use the “one
country, one vote” model employed by the United Nations, but rather they have a system
of weighted voting based on quotas, which represent a country’s economic significance,
and translate that into voting shares (Woods 2006). Voting shares represent a country’s
percentage of the total votes in the institution (see Table 2.3 for U.S. voting shares in the
MDBs).

Table 2.3 U.S. Contributions and Voting Shares in the MDBs
Bank
World Bank
IBRD
IDA
IFC
MIGA
AsDB
AsDB
AsDF
EBRD
IADB
IDB

Contribution Share %

Voting Share %

16.8
22.1
24.1
18.9

16.4
11.2
23.6
15.1

15.6
12.6
10.1

12.8
12.8
9.8

30.3

30.0
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FSO
IIC
MIF
AfDB
AfDB
AfDF

50.5
25.5
39.4

30.0
25.1
29.1

6.4
12.7

6.4
6.1

The World Bank also uses the same quota that provides the basis for a country’s
voting share in the IMF. This is significant because the current quota used by the IMF is
supposed to represent a countries contribution to the world economy, but there are
significant political factors that go into determining a country’s IMF quota (Rapkin and
Strand 2005; 2006). IMF quota size is partially determined by a complex weighted
formula that includes a country’s GDP, exports, imports and financial reserves. The
quota determined by this formula has come under fire since it is not clear why certain
variables are included, and others are left out. It is also unclear what the quota is meant
to represent. Rapkin and Strand (2005: 1995) note that the, “single quota measure is
supposed to accomplish multiple objectives: ability to contribute (GDP, reserves), access
to resources according to need and vulnerability (as indicated by variability of export
receipts), and voting weights as reflective of relative importance in the world economy
(GDP).”
To add to the confusion surrounding the calculation of the quota and what it is
supposed to represent, the actual quotas used to assign voting shares are derived from
negotiations that use the calculated quota only as a starting point (Rapkin and Strand
2005). In addition to the quota there are “basic votes” that each country gets for
membership in the World Bank and IMF. These “basic votes” are meant to give some
minimum measure of voting weight to all member states (See Table 2.4 for number of
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basic votes in each MDB). In the World Bank each state is given 250 votes plus one
additional vote for each share of the Bank’s capital stock the country holds (which is
represented by the quota) to determine their overall voting weight (World Bank 2010).

Table 2.4 Number of Basic Votes in each MDB
Bank
World
Bank
AfDB
IDB
AsDB
EBRD

Number of Basic Votes each country gets
250
625
135
20% of total
No Basic Votes

As was mentioned above, representation on the Executive Board of each of the
MDBs is consolidated into “voting groups.” These voting groups must elect one country
to represent the group in the Executive Board. The selection of a group representative is
done using a simple majority. The catch, however, is that in some of the voting groups
certain members act as “dictators”, and essentially ensure their own selection as the
group’s representative (Strand 2001). In certain voting groups some member states by
themselves constitute a majority of the voting shares and therefore are able to in effect
select themselves as representatives. For example, in the African Development Bank
Algeria, Guinea Bissau, and Madagascar together comprise one voting group. The total
shares owned by that group of countries is 103,991, which means to be “elected” to
represent that group in the Executive Board one country has to get a majority of those
103,991 shares. In this group Algeria effectively acts as a dictator able to select itself as
the group’s representative since it has 87, 979 of the 103,991 voting shares. Guinea
Bissau and Madagascar have 1,225 and 14,787 shares respectively (African Development
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Bank 2010). The result of this is that many members of the MDBs have virtually no
formal influence in the MDB Executive Boards.
This system of weighted voting combined with the fact that most countries are
represented in groups on the Executive Boards in the MDBs gives way to a variety of
majority combinations that make passage, or approval, of projects possible. Also it
shows that one cannot discern from a country’s voting weight alone how much influence
or power that country has in the institution. Instead one must look at the country’s
relative voting power i.e. ability to determine winning coalitions to asses how influential
that country is (Strand 1999; 2001; 2003; 2003a).
Another aspect of the formal rules in the MDBs that bears mentioning are special
majorities, which are required for the passage of certain items. In general, a simple
majority is enough for the approval of loans and projects in the Executive Board. For
major issues, which are usually decided by the Board of Governors, super majorities are
often required. For example to add new members or increase the capital stock in the IDB
requires 75% approval. In addition some of these special majorities ensure that no major
changes will be made without the approval of the largest shareholders. For example in
the EBRD many of the major decisions of the Board of Governors require two-thirds
approval but also three-fourths of the total voting power. So in other words if two-thirds
of the member states approve of a change in the Board of Governor’s in the EBRD the
change will only be made if that two-thirds also represents three-fourths of the total
voting power (Carrasco et al. 2009). This significantly benefits the largest contributors
to this institution since there support is necessary for any changes to be made.
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Along with the formal rules of the MDBs, informal procedures also play a
significant role in how decisions are made. The decisions made in both the Board of
Governors and the Executive Board are based on consensus with formal votes only taken
on rare occasions. The use of the consensus decision-making process makes examining
the dynamics of decision making in both places difficult since the formal counting of
votes is rare. Also because of the consensus decision-making requirement much of the
politicking on decisions takes place before the Executive Boards meet, making it difficult
to observe horse-trading and other political dynamics that occur in all political bodies
(Woods 2006).
Despite the fact that formal votes are rarely taken, the decisions on loan projects
take place in what Lyne et al. (2009: 413) describe as, “the shadow of the formal majority
rule.” What this means is that the vast majority of the projects that come before the
Executive Board for formal approval are those that are likely to gain majority approval.
In other words, projects that are unlikely to garner majority support among the EDs on
the Executive Board are not brought before the board for approval. The professional staff
and administrators of the MDBs often work with potential borrowing states in crafting
proposals, and the MDB and borrower agree upon the terms of the loan or credit before it
is brought before the Executive Board for approval. It is early on in this loan
development/approval process where potential projects are scuttled if EDs informally
express reservations regarding the project (Lyne et. al. 2009). The United States is
particularly involved in this process. Members of the USED staff work closely with
MDB staff and with borrowing countries on developing projects. This is especially the

59
case in the World Bank since the institution is located in Washington D.C., giving the
Banks staff access to U.S. policymakers (Interview State Department Official 2011).

MDBs: Funding
The operational resources for the MDBs come from contributions from member
states, interest from bonds issued on capital markets, and interest paid on loans (loan
reflows) (Babb 2009). Lending in the MDBs is financed from two sources. Hard loans
are financed from money borrowed on international capital markets. The MDBs can
borrow at favorable rates since they have financial backing from capital subscribed to
them by member states. A small portion of this capital is paid by member states (known
as paid in capital) while the rest is guaranteed (known as callable capital) if necessary,
although the reliance on callable capital from member states has never been used
(Sanford 2001a; Babb 2009). Callable capital cannot be used to fund new obligations
(i.e. fund new loan proposals) but only to pay off current obligations. Callable capital
allows the MDBs to borrow on favorable terms on world capital markets to finance its
loans and this allows the MDBs to lend at much greater rates than the amount of actual
paid in capital the MDBs receive (USGAO 2001).
Callable capital is similar to a promissory note in that it represents an agreement
by member states to pay MDB debts if the institution cannot pay its debt through the
other means available to it. If an MDB found itself in the position in which it was
necessary to make a call on its callable capital to pay off a debt it would need to make
calls until it received enough money to meet its payment. Since member states contribute
different rates of callable capital independent of each other they have different
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obligations when a call is made. In other words no state is required to pay more than the
callable capital it has already promised (USGAO 2001).
The soft (or concessional) loans are financed through contributions from member
states. Since these loans are not usually profitable for the MDBs these funds have to be
periodically replenished (Sanford 2001a; Babb 2009). The upside of concessional
lending by the MDBs is that it doesn’t require the institution to raise money on world
capital markets and expose itself to interest rate risk. On the other hand, the downside of
concessional lending is that, since it is lending to the least developed and poorest
countries, it opens the MDBs up to the credit risks of their borrowers (USGAO 2001).
Because concessional loans require periodic replenishment this opens up a door for
politics it enter into MDB decision-making. This was one of the major concerns during
the build up to the creation of the World Bank’s soft loan window, the IDA.
This overview of the MDBs highlights how these institutions were created and
have evolved, how their lending policies work, their decision-making procedures, and
how they are funded. It describes the specific institutional context in which the U.S.
pursues its foreign policy objectives. Although the U.S. exerts a significant amount of
influence in the MDBs it is still constrained from pursuing some of its policy objectives
in multilateral institutions. The next chapter focuses specifically on the role of human
rights in influencing U.S. voting behavior in the MDBs.
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CHAPTER 3: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Research Design
Theoretical Framework: Human Rights and Strategic Interests
The literature review showed that previous studies of U.S. foreign aid policy
determined that strategic interests of the U.S. -- such as helping allies and promoting
domestic economic prosperity -- competed with normative concerns, such as promoting
human rights, to influence U.S. foreign aid policy. The question left unanswered is what
is the relative importance of these goals in determining U.S. foreign aid policy? In other
words, are these mutually exclusive goals where strategic interests always trump
normative goals or are there certain contexts where promoting human rights takes
precedence over supporting allies or promoting economy prosperity?
It is worth mentioning again that the division between strategic interests and
normative values in U.S. foreign policy is not always clear. This is specifically evident
with human rights in U.S. foreign policy. One can argue that promoting human rights is
not only in accord with American values but also with America’s strategic interests.
Joseph Nye essentially makes this point in his argument in favor of soft power.
According to Nye, soft power is attractive power that can be used to create desired policy
outcomes, and the sources of such power are often found in the values a country
expresses (2004). Following this logic one can argue that promoting human rights is
connected to U.S. strategic interests to the extent that it creates soft power that allows the
U.S. to achieve its goals, which would include ensuring national security and promoting
the domestic economy. A different version of this argument would be that promoting
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human rights is a matter of strategic interests because the more countries that respect
human rights the more secure the United States is (Schultz 2002). Despite that fact that it
is difficult to disentangle the difference between interests and values in U.S. foreign
policy particularly with regards to promoting human rights it is still a useful analytical
distinction to make and has theoretical support.
With previously articulated caveat in mind, in this section I utilize a simple
theoretical framework to identify how strategic interests and normative values influence
U.S. foreign policy. The framework was originally created as an explanation for U.S.
asylum enforcement: Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) developed a model of U.S.
foreign policy to explain why the U.S. would chose to grant asylum to people from
certain countries at certain times and for what reasons. Asylum policy and multilateral
aid policy are two different areas of U.S. foreign policy but they both are reflective of the
underlying factors of normative and strategic interests. The utility of Rosenblum and
Salehyan’s model is in emphasizing the relative importance of those two factors in
determining the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
The theoretical framework places U.S. votes in the MDBs along two axes: human
rights and strategic interests (Figure 3.1). The strategic interest axis measures the
strategic importance of a country to the U.S. The category of strategic interests is
comprised of two components: helping allies and promoting domestic economic
prosperity. In strategic interest terms the U.S. supports loans to countries in the MDBs
because those countries are important to the U.S. for security or economic reasons. So
the U.S. will support proposals to countries that it considers its allies (either formal or
informal) and also support proposals to countries that are economically important to it.
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On the strategic axis the areas to the right of the origin are given a positive value. That
means the country is strategically important to the U.S., which is inclined to support
proposals to that country. Negative values to the left of the origin on the strategic axis
indicate the U.S. does not have strategic interests invested in that country, and may even
be outright antagonistic towards it, and therefore will be more inclined to not support
proposals to that country. The human rights axis gauges the human rights record of the
recipient states. Above the origin on the human rights axis are positive values, which
indicate the recipient country has a positive human rights record, and means the U.S. will
be more inclined to support proposals to that country. Below the origin on the human
rights axis are negative values that indicate that the recipient country has a poor human
rights record and implies that the U.S. will be less inclined to support proposals to that
country.
Human Rights
II

Positive

I

Strategic
Interests

Low

III

High

Negative

IV
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Figure 3.1 Human Rights and Strategic Interests

These two policy dimensions (human rights and strategic interests) create four
quadrants in which recipient countries of MBD proposals can be placed. The first
quadrant (I) contains countries with positive human rights records that are also
strategically important to the United States. The second quadrant (II) contains those
countries that have a positive human rights record but are not strategically important to
the United States. The third quadrant (III) contains countries that have neither a positive
human rights record nor are of strategic importance to the U.S. The fourth and final
quadrant (IV) contains those countries, which are strategically important to the U.S. but
have a poor human rights record.
One can surmise that the U.S. will approve proposals to countries in quadrant I
since those countries are both strategically important to the U.S. and have positive human
rights record. Conversely once can also surmise that the U.S. will not approve proposals
for countries in quadrant III since those states are neither strategically important to the
U.S. nor have a positive human rights record. It is in quadrants II and IV in which more
variation in U.S. approval may be seen. In these two quadrants one can see to what
extent strategic interests trump human rights or vice versa since they prescribe conflicting
responses by the U.S. Given the previous literature on U.S. voting in the MDBs one
would conclude that strategic interests will trump human rights, but since the end of the
Cold War that pattern has not been strongly reflected in bilateral aid allocation. So the
same may hold in the MDBs. From this theoretical perspective one can derive a variety
of hypothesis to test
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Hypotheses
From the two-dimension theoretical framework used in this study one can derive
two types of hypothesis: ones that test the human rights claims and ones that test the
strategic interest claims. Regarding the human rights claims the first hypothesis is:
H1: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries with poor human rights
records in the MDBs
Turning to strategic interests that may influence U.S. votes in the MDBs I will test
two hypothesis that touch on both dimensions of strategic interests: supporting allies and
promoting domestic economic prosperity. The first tests the economic connection
between the recipient country and the U.S. through the volume of trade between the two
states:
H2: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries with which it has a
lower volume of trade in the MDBs.
The alliance component of the strategic interests dimension will be tested using two
different measures: UN General Assembly voting similarity and military aid:
H3: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries that it does not have
a close UN voting similarity with in the MDBs.
H4: The U.S. will be more likely to vote against countries to which it does not
give military aid in the MDBs.
Finally, I hypothesize that the U.S. will support loans to poorer countries. This may
happen regardless of their human rights record or strategic interest to the U.S. Since the
purpose of multilateral aid is to channel money to the poorest states, and since the U.S. is
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operating in these institutions, one can assume that the U.S. ultimately supports the
raison d’être of the MDBs.
H5: The U.S. will be less likely to vote against poorer countries in the MDBs

Data Description
This study will use pooled cross-sectional time series data of U.S. votes in the
MDBs by country and year for a total of 9,766 observations. The temporal dimension of
the data ranges from 2004-2009 and the spatial dimension covers 165 countries, which
includes the territories of the Canary Islands, Cook Islands, and the Palestinian West
Bank and Gaza. From 2004-2006 Serbia and Montenegro were considered the same but
from 2007 onward they were considered separate in terms of votes in the MDBs. There
is also a Regional category, which includes votes on proposals that involved more than
one country or region.3 The dataset is unbalanced since not every country seeks approval
for projects in the MDBs every year.
The data available for U.S. votes on MDB lending decisions range from 2004 to
the present, so the time period under evaluation is somewhat limited. The data are
skewed toward the “yes” votes with the U.S. expressing approval for particular MDB
decisions roughly 87% of the time. However, since the number of observations overall is
large there is enough variation in the dependent variable to enable meaningful inferences.
This pattern is consistent with previous studies examining the U.S. MDB voting record
during previous eras. A participant in the inter-agency MDB policymaking process in the
Those original regional votes in which all the individual countries that are a part of the
proposal could be identified were disaggregated and a separate observation was created
for each country. Those original regional observations in which it was not established
which countries were a part of the project were left as one regional observation.

3
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1970s recalled, “about 95% of the things that come up are no problem and go through
very easily. The other 5% caused all the difficulty.” (quoted in Sanford 2005: 4).
Because such a small percentage of loan projects are rejected by the U.S., those that are
rejected enhance the signal the U.S. is sending since it is used sparingly recipient states
(and other states as well) must take notice.
The voting data is published by the Treasury Department on its website (2011)
and it contains a brief description of the projects voted on, which Bank and Lending
Window it was brought before, the date it was voted on, the amount of the loan, how the
U.S. voted on the proposal (yes, no, abstain), and a reason code.

Variables
The main dependent variable used in this study is U.S. votes in the MDBs
(USVOTE) by country and year. The range of vote choices available are yes, no, or
abstain. A “yes” vote expresses approval for the particular project under consideration
while “no” and “abstain” can be collapsed into one category as they both indicate
disapproval. Therefore the dependent variable for U.S. votes on MDB lending decisions
will be a dichotomous variable with “yes” = 1 and “no/abstain” = 0. The reason for
combining no and abstain votes into the same category is that they both signal
disapproval and they both can ultimately lead to the rejection of a project. Passage of any
proposal in the MDBs is usually done by majority consensus (and in some cases super
majority consensus) and therefore an abstention by the U.S. (or any other country) can be
enough to prevent the passage of the proposal if the U.S. affirmative vote would have
given the proposal majority approval. Also, since yes votes are overwhelmingly the most
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common response by the U.S. in the MDBs any deviation from that, whether a no vote or
abstention, is a significant and purposeful action done with the intention of expressing
disapproval.
The main independent variables are: human rights, supporting allies, promoting
domestic economic prosperity, and level of development. Human rights can be broken
down into two components: personal integrity rights (PI) and political rights (POL).
Personal integrity rights, “include the right to life and the inviolability of the human
person.” (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009) Examples of violations of rights of personal
integrity include arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killing and other violations of
bodily integrity (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). Political rights include rights to political
participation, examples include freedom of speech, right to vote etc. Political rights are
often used as a measure of how democratic a country is (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).
Although theoretically there is overlap between these two components of human rights,
empirically one can find divergence. There are countries that can show respect for one
category of rights and not the other. For example, there are democracies in the world that
engage in arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killing and even torture, therefore showing
more respect for one category of rights (political) and less respect for other rights
(personal integrity) (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).
I measure political rights using the Freedom House survey of government respect
for political rights (Freedom House 2010). The variable POL is the countries score on
Freedom House’s measure of a country’s respect for political rights. The organization
Freedom House releases an annual Freedom in the World survey, which rates countries
on their respect for political rights on a 7-point scale with 1 indicating the highest level of
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freedom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom. Under Freedom House’s
designation the category of political rights includes free and fair elections, ability to form
political parties, and popular sovereignty (Freedom House 2006).
More specifically, on the political rights scale a 1 = a country with full electoral
freedom, political parties are free to form, the political opposition has some power in
government, and minorities are protected. A 2 = less free than 1, there is some
discrimination against minorities, there is some small amount of corruption or political
violence, and the military or foreign governments may be weakening the quality of
freedom. A 3,4, or 5 = the same problems in category two except to a greater degree and
also other threats to freedom such as civil war, heavy military involvement in politics,
unfair elections, one party rule. Countries in this category, however, also have some
political rights such as the ability to organize some loose opposition and means to
influence the government, which could include popular referendums etc. 6 = countries
governed by autocrats, military juntas etc. and there is only the most minimum of
political rights such as some small consideration of minorities and/or some tolerance for
political discussion. Category 7 = not free, meaning political rights are nonexistent also
these countries exhibit extreme violence and perhaps even lack central governance
(Freedom House 2006). One criticism of Freedom House is that their measures are less
reliable than other human rights measures since the organization has been less forthright
about its source information for which it constructs its scales (Landman 2005). Despite
this it is still a widely used measure and correlates highly with other scales of political
rights (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).
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Personal Integrity (PI) rights are operationalized using the Political Terror Scale
(PTS), which uses U.S. State Department and Amnesty International country reports to
create a 5-point scale of repression of personal integrity rights (Gibney et. al. 2010). The
personal integrity rights violations encompassed by the PTS include extrajudicial killing,
torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment. The PTS dataset captures violations
of the rights of personal integrity along three dimensions: scope which includes the type
of violence, intensity which refers to how frequent the violence is, and range which
describes the percentage of the population targeted (Gibney et. al. 2010). Again the PTS
is a 5-point scale of political terror with a 5 indicating large-scale and indiscriminate
repression and a 1 indicating countries with little to no threats to individual physical
integrity. More specifically, level 1 includes countries under secure rule of law and
political imprisonment, torture, and political murder is extremely rare or non-existent.
Level 2 includes countries where there is a small amount of political imprisonment and
torture and political murder are rare. Level 3 includes countries where political
imprisonment is extensive, execution and political murder are common and unlimited
detention occurs. Level 4 includes countries in which the practices in Level 3 are
increases. Murder, disappearances, and torture are more common but the level of terror
still mostly affects those involved in politics. Finally, Level 5 includes countries where
the level of terror exhibited in Level 4 is spread to the entire population and there are no
limits on the leadership of the country in its pursuit of personal or political goals (Wood
and Gibney 2010).
Conceptually there is overlap between the measures of political rights and rights
of personal integrity. However, in terms of the scales used in this dissertation there is
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actually very little overlap. Previous studies that have used both Freedom House and the
Political Terror Scale have also found little overlap in the measures (Hafner-Burton and
Ron 2009). The pearson correlation between the two scales used in this study is .433 (see
Table 3.1) indicating that the two scales are measuring different measures of human
rights.
Turning to strategic interests, I have hypothesized that the U.S. will be more
supportive of proposals for countries that it considers allies (either formal or informal).
Allies therefore is measured in two ways. First is whether a country receives military aid
(MILAID) from the U.S. or not.

Whether a country receives military aid from the U.S.

or not is a good indicator of how important of an ally the U.S. perceives that country to
be, or wants that country to be. The reasons why the U.S. chooses to give military aid to
recipient countries are often complex and multifaceted. Usually military aid is given by
the U.S. to exert some measure of influence in the recipient country, primarily in the
name of national security. Sometimes U.S. military aid achieves its intended results
(U.S. influence) but often it only engenders a pushback from the recipient country to U.S.
requests (Sullivan, Tessman, Li 2011). Regardless of the result of the U.S. giving
military aid the reason for giving it indicate that its purpose serves strategic interests by
bringing foreign governments closer to the U.S. position. In other words, if a country
receives military aid from the U.S. that indicates a security relationship between the U.S.
and the recipient country and therefore signals the country as a military ally (Rosenblum
and Salehayn 2004).
With regards to military alliances the more prominent measure used in the foreign
aid literature is the alliance data provided by the Correlates of War Project. This is a
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useful measure and may even be a better measure than military aid, however, the only
problem is that it only goes to 2000 and the temporal dimension used in this study is from
2004-2009. As with previous studies which use U.S. military aid (Rosenblum and
Salehayn 2004), I created a dummy variable coded 1 for countries that receive military
aid from the U.S. and coded 0 for countries that do not. Military aid data is gathered from
the US Overseas Loans and Grants (2010) document, otherwise known as the
“Greenbook”, published annually by USAID.
In addition to receiving military aid, an ally is also operationalized using a
country’s voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly (UNVOTE).
Voting similarity in the UN General Assembly is a common measure to determine how
close countries are politically (Kim and Russett 1996; Alesina and Dollar 1998; Gartzke
1998; Voeten 2004). The use of similarity in General Assembly votes reveals a couple of
interesting insights. First, UN General Assembly votes provide a tangible measure of
state preference, which is necessary to establish if one is trying to gauge how close they
are politically (i.e. whether they are allied around common values and interests or not).
Also, they show how difficult it might be for the U.S. to build multilateral coalitions to
deal with international problems, which are a relatively inexpensive way of dealing with
international issues (especially when compared with unilateral coercion) (Voeten 2004).
To determine which General Assembly votes are considered important to the U.S.
I consult the United States Participation in the United Nations document (2010). This
document is produced annually by the State Department and identifies those votes in
which direct U.S. interests are at stake, and votes in which the U.S. lobbied extensively.
More specifically, it breaks down the votes across issue areas (e.g. human rights) and it
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describes the efforts in which U.S. representative in the UN have tried to persuade other
countries to support the U.S. position. Narrowing the focus of UN General Assembly
votes to only “important” votes provides a better measure of congruency between the
U.S. and other countries since these votes are by definition ones that the U.S. feels the
most strongly about and perceives its interests are on the line. The measure itself then is
constructed by taking the number of important votes in which the U.S. and the country in
question voted identical (either both yes or both no) divided by the total number of
important identical votes and important opposite votes (where the U.S. voted yes and the
state in question voted no and vice versa). The number then is the percentage of voting
similarity between the U.S. and country in question on votes considered important by the
U.S. and ranges from 0, indicating no similarity, to 100, indicating perfect similarity.
Economic importance is measured by the volume of trade (TRADE) a country has
with the U.S., which is just the sum of U.S. exports to and imports from a recipient
country in a given year. In the logit model a natural log scale is used for level of trade.
Volume of trade is an appropriate measure of how important a country is economically to
the U.S. The greater the trade volume between countries the greater the opportunity for
slight variation in the volume of trade to influence the economic performance of each
country therefore making them highly dependent on one another. The export and import
data comes from Correlates of War project for the years of 2003-2006 (Barbieri et al.
2008). For the years of 2007-2009 the data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau on
foreign trade statistics (2010).
Finally, level of development (DEV) is measured using GDP per capita in U.S.
dollars. As with level of trade, level of development is also transformed into a natural log
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scale for the logit model. GDP per capita provides both a measure of a country’s
economic output and its level of development. GDP per capita (or level of development)
also serves as a proxy for recipient countries’ needs (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz
2009). Or another way to state it is that GDP per capita represents the demand a country
has for development projects. Higher GDP per capita numbers would obviously
represent less need or less demand and lower GDP per capita would represent more need
or greater demand. GDP per capita information comes from the IMF World Economic
Outlook database (2010). Additionally, in keeping with the scholarly practice, all
independent variables are lagged one year to reflect the information available to decision
makers when voting decisions were made (Meernik et al. 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999;
Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). The correlation matrix for the
independent variables is presented in Table 5. It shows little correlation between the
independent variables.

Table 3.1 Correlation Matrix
POL

PI

MILAID

UNVOTE

POL

1.0000

PI

0.3797

1.0000

MILAID

-0.0802

-0.0176

1.0000

UNVOTE

-0.4422

-0.3496

0.0648

1.0000

(ln)TRADE
(ln)DEV

-0.0730
-0.3181

0.3566
-0.2198

-0.1320
-0.0477

-0.1082
0.2733

(ln)TRADE (ln)DEV

1.0000
0.5100

1.0000
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Methodology
To test my hypothesis I use logit analysis. Dichotomous dependent variables
create problems for statistical inferences using linear regression. Logistic regression, on
the other hand, can transform non-linear relationships into linear relationships allowing
one to make valid statistical inferences (Pampel 2000). When using pooled time-series
cross-sectional data two issues that often arise are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
The main concern with cross-sectionally dominant pooled time-series cross-sectional data
is heteroskedasticity. The most important assumption of time-series cross-sectional
analysis is pooling, which is the notion that “all units are characterized by the same
regression equation at all points in time.” (Beck and Katz 1995: 636) This assumption
can create issues with the error terms. Homoskedasticity is the assumption that all the
errors have the same variance, or all the errors are independent from one another. When
dealing with cross-national data it is likely that the errors will not be independent as
situations that occur in one country often have spillover effects that influence other
countries. In the area of human rights one can imagine two countries involved in conflict
with each other might both see their record on human rights deteriorate due to the
conflict. To account for potential heteroskedasticity I will employ robust standard errors
(White 1980). The logit equation is as follows:

USVOTEit = β0 + β1POLit-1 + βPIit-1 + βMILAIDit-1 + βUNGAVOTEit-1 +
βln(TRADE)it-1 + βln(DEV)it-1 + εit
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Where USVOTEit represents the voting decision by the U.S. in the MDBs. POLit-1 and PIit1 correspond

to political and personal integrity rights respectively, while MILAIDit-1

relates to military aid and UNGAVOTEit-1 voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN.
Finally, ln(TRADE)it-1 represents the level of trade between the U.S. and the recipient
country and ln(DEV)it-1 represents the level of development of the recipient country.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Before reporting the results of the logit model, Table 3.2 presents the descriptive
statistics for the independent variables used. In total there are 9,022 observations in the
full model. The mode for U.S. votes is 1 and the mean is 87 percent. The median for the
political rights variable (POL) is 3 on the 1-7 Freedom House scale and the mean is 3.9.
The median for the rights of personal integrity variable (PI) is 3 on the 1-5 Political
Terror Scale and the mean is 3.2. The mode for military aid (MILAID) is 1 while the
mean is .80. The mean for voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN (UNVOTE) is 29
percent. The median level of trade (TRADE) is $2,562 as measured in $US millions,
however the mean for level of trade is $27,117 reflects the high level of trade between the
U.S. and China which skews the distribution. The mean for level of development (DEV)
is $3,011 measured as per capita GDP and the median for level of development is $1933
per capita GDP.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Obs

Mean

Median

Mode

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

USVOTE

9766

0.865554

1

1 0.3411484

0

1

POL

9300

3.721914

3

3

1.874803

1

7

PI

9222

3.204186

3

3 0.9133669

1

5

MILAID

9380 0.7979744

1

1 0.4015326

0

1

UNVOTE

9234

29.24429

25

0

22.68708

0

100

TRADE

9198

27117.52

2562.35

2072.12

77514.81

0 407505.4

DEV

9220

3011.735

1933.74

5325.82

3053.336

82.64 32926.95

Logit Estimation Results
The results of the logit estimation are found in Table 3.3. The results show that
respect for political rights (POL), whether the country receives military aid from the U.S.
(MILAID); voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN (UNVOTE), and; level of economic
development (lnDEV) are all significant predictors of U.S. votes in the MDBs. Respect
for rights of personal integrity (PI) and level of trade with the U.S. (lnTRADE) were not
significant predictors. The likelihood of the U.S. voting yes in the MDBs is negatively
influenced by a decrease in respect for political rights. In other words, as the level of
respect for political rights diminishes, the likelihood that the U.S. will vote for projects
going to that country also diminishes. The log odds of respect for political rights is
-0.348, which means every one unit increase in lack of respect for political rights
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decreases the logged odds of the U.S. voting yes in the MDBs by 0.348. The coefficient
for military aid is 1.000 indicating that for countries that receive military aid from the
U.S. the log odds of the U.S. voting yes increase by 1.000. The coefficient for UN voting
similarity indicates that for every one-unit increase in voting similarity the log odds of the
U.S. voting yes decreases by -0.013. This is not in the hypothesized direction but the
effect is also quite small.

Finally, the coefficient for level of development indicates that

for every one unit increase in level of development the log odds of the U.S. voting yes in
the MDBs decreases by 0.253.

Table 3.3 Logit Estimation: Log Odds
Variable

Coefficient

POL

-0.3480592***
(.0503003)
0.0456007
(.0929855)
1.000852***
(.1868296)
-.0127865***
(.0037732)
.035066
(.05058)
-0.252843**
(.0911212)

PI
MILAID
UNVOTE
(ln)TRADE
(ln)DEV
N
Pseudo R2
Wald Chi2

9022
0.0757
81.13

Note: Model estimated using Logistic regression. Robust standard errors clustered
around country years included in parenthesis
***p≤0.001 **p≤0.01 * p≤0.10

79
The difficulty in interpreting the logged odds is that the units of the dependent
variable have little intuitive meaning (Pampel 2000). The odds ratios are presented in
Table 8 and have a more intuitive interpretation. The odds ratio is the probability of an
event occurring (U.S. votes yes in the MDBs) divided by the probability of an event not
occurring (U.S. votes no in the MDBs) and comparing that number to the probability of
an event occurring. The odds ratio for political rights is 0.706, which means that as
respect for political rights decreases the odds of the U.S. voting yes are 0.706 to 1. The
odds ratio of military aid is 2.72, which means that for countries that receive military aid
from the U.S., the odds that the U.S. will vote in their favor are 2.72 to 1. The odds ratio
for UN voting similarity is 0.987, which means that as voting similarity with the U.S. in
the UN increases the odds of a U.S. yes vote are 0.987 to 1. These are basically even
odds indicating that UN voting similarity has virtually no effect on U.S. voting in the
MDBs. Finally, the odds ratio for level of development is 0.777, which means that as the
level of development of a country increases the odds of the U.S. voting yes for that
country are 0.777 to 1.
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Table 3.4 Logit Estimation: Odds Ratio
Variable
POL
PI
MILAID
UNVOTE
(ln)TRADE
(ln)DEV
N
Pseudo R2
Wald Chi2

Coefficient
0.7060571***
(0.0355149)
1.046656
(0.0973238)
2.720599***
(0.5082885)
0.9872949***
(0.037252)
1.035688
(0.0523851)
0.7765898**
(0.0707638)
9022
0.0757
81.13

Note: Model estimated using Logistic regression. Robust standard errors clustered
around country years included in parenthesis
***p≤0.001 **p≤0.01 * p≤0.05
In order to get a better sense of the impact of the independent variables on the
odds of the U.S. voting yes on a proposal, Figure 3.2 shows the percent change in the
odds ratio for each variable. For respect for political rights the figure shows that for a
one unit increase in lack of respect for political rights, the odds of a yes vote by the U.S.
decreases by roughly 29.4 percent. The effect of the U.S. supplying military aid to
recipient countries has the largest effect on the likelihood the U.S. will vote in their favor
in the MDBs. The percent change in the odds ratio for military aid is 172 percent
meaning the odds of a yes vote by the U.S. are 172 percent greater for those countries
that receive U.S. military aid. Although voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN is a
significant predictor the direction is not in the expected direction. The negative direction
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indicates that as voting similarity with the U.S. increases the likelihood of a yes vote by
the U.S. decreases. More important is that the effect of UN voting similarity is minimal.
As Figure 3.2 shows the actual effect of UN voting is only a -1.3 percent change in the
odds ratio or, in other words, there is for all intents and purposes no effect of UN voting
similarity on U.S. voting in the MDBs. The last significant variable is level of
development. The more developed a country is, as measured by GDP per capita, the less
likely it is that the U.S. will vote in favor of that country in the MDBs. The percent
change for level of development is that for a one-unit increase in the level of
development the odds of a yes vote by the U.S. decrease by 22 percent

Figure 3.2 Percent Change in Odds Ratio

Predicted Probabilities
Another way to interpret the results of the logit estimation model is as a type of
predicted probabilities. Predicted probabilities differ from log odds and odds ratio in that
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they provide the probability of a yes vote by the U.S. at each level of the independent
variables. Figure 3.3 presents a scatter plot of the predicted probabilities of a U.S. yes
vote across the observed probabilities for each level of the political rights variable. As
can be seen the logistic regression line slopes downward as the political rights category
increases, and especially slopes downward towards the last two categories with a steep
decline in the last category. Figure 3.4 presents a scatter plot of the predicted
probabilities of a U.S. yes vote across the observed probabilities for both levels of the
military aid variable. The regression line slopes significantly upward as it moves from no
U.S. military aid to receives military aid. Finally, Figure 3.5 presents a scatter plot of the
predicted probabilities of a U.S. yes votes across all the observations of level of
development. The regression line does slope downward as the level of development
increases but the downward trend is very small.
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Figure 3.3 Predicted Probabilities of U.S. Yes Vote Across Political Rights
Observed P(usvote=1)

Predicted P(usvote=1)

Probability usvote=1

.900957

.732569
0

Military Aid

Figure 3.4 Predicted Probabilities of U.S. Yes Vote Across Military Aid

1
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Figure 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of U.S. Vote Across Level of Development

Table 3.5 presents the predicted probabilities for each level of the political rights
variable. As it shows, the predicted probability of a yes vote at the first level is roughly
92 percent, which is what would be expected since level one represents the most respect
for political rights. As the level of respect for political rights decreases the predicted
probability of a U.S. yes vote decreases. The exception here is at level five where the
predicted probability is roughly 92 percent, whereas at level four it was at 87 percent.
Moving to level six the predicted probability decreases strikingly to 81 percent and then
drops even more significantly to 66 percent at level seven. This indicates that for those
countries which completely disregard respect for political rights the probability of
receiving a yes vote from the U.S. is 66 percent, which is much lower than the mean for
yes votes overall (88 percent). The conclusion is that for those countries with the least
respect for political rights the probability that the U.S. will vote for proposals going to
those countries decreases dramatically. The drop in the probability is not uniform across
each level of the political rights variable. From levels one through five the probability is
roughly the same and then declines greatly for levels six and seven.
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Table 3.5 Predicted Probabilities for Political Rights

POL
1

Predicted
Probability
0.922

2

0.940

3

0.911

4

0.871

5

0.901

6

0.809

7

0.658

Moving to the military aid variable, Table 3.6 shows the predicted probability of
U.S. yes votes for both levels of the military aid variable. When a country does not
receive military aid from the U.S. the probability of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. is
78 percent, but for countries that do receive U.S. military aid the probability increases to
roughly 91 percent. This again shows how the U.S. privileges countries in the MDBs
who receive military aid since the mean for U.S. yes votes is 88 percent. This is
significantly higher than the predicted probability of 78 percent of a U.S. yes vote for
countries that do not receive U.S. military aid. Finally, Table 3.7 shows the predicted
probability of a U.S. yes vote at five different levels of per capita GDP. The five levels
constitute two standard deviations above and below the mean (5, 1), one standard
deviation above and below the mean (4, 2) and then also the mean (3). The change in
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probabilities is slight but noticeable for countries with greater per capita GDP. At the
lowest level of per capita GDP the probability of a country receiving a yes vote from the
U.S. was 92 percent, but for countries at the highest level of per capita GDP the
probability was only 80 percent. The difference is twelve percent and it shows that the
more developed countries seeking MDB loans tended to have a slightly below average
chance of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. in the MDBs.

Table 3.6 Predicted Probabilities for Military Aid

Predicted
MILAID Probability
0

0.783

1

0.908

Table 3.7 Predicted Probabilities for Level of Development

(ln)DEV

Predicted
Probability

1

0.920

2

0.897

3

0.870

4

0.837

5

0.799
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Effect of Human Rights on Predicted Values
The main focus of this study is on human rights. We have shown that the respect
for political rights variable is highly significant, thus it is important to examine how
influential human rights are in different contexts: when a country receives military aid, or
whether a country has a low level of economic development, or a relatively high level of
economic development. Table 3.8 displays the predicted probabilities of yes votes by the
U.S. at each level of the political rights variable and at both levels of the military aid
variable. What it shows is that for countries that do not receive U.S. military aid but do
respect political rights the probability of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. is 90 percent.
However, for those countries that do not respect political rights and also do not receive
military aid from the U.S. the probability of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. decreases
to 54 percent. This is a negative change of 37 percent. For those countries that do
receive military aid from the U.S. and also respect political rights the probability of the
U.S. voting in favor of policies for their country is 96 percent. On the other hand, for
those countries that receive U.S. military aid but do not respect political rights the
predicted probability of a U.S. yes vote is 76 percent. This is a decrease in the probability
by 20 percent.
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Table 3.8. Predicted Probabilities at each level of Political Rights and Military Aid

Political Rights

No Military
Aid

Military Aid

% Change (0-1)

1

0.9028

0.9619

6%

2

0.8677

0.9469

8%

3

0.8224

0.9264

10%

4

0.7657

0.8989

13%

5

0.6977

0.8626

16%

6

0.6197

0.8159

20%

7

0.5350

0.7579

22%

% Change (1-7)

-37%

-20%

This difference between a decline of 37 percent and a decline of 20 percent is 17
percent, which shows that receiving military aid has a positive impact on the probability
of receiving a yes vote from the U.S. even for those countries which violate political
rights. Figure 3.6 graphically presents the effect of change from no military aid to
military aid on the probability of U.S. yes votes in the MDBs for each level of the
political rights scale. It shows that military aid has little impact on the change in
probabilities at level one of the political rights variable because those countries already
have a high probability of a yes vote. The impact is seen more significantly at level
seven where receiving military aid increases the probability of a yes vote by 22 percent.
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Figure 3.6 Percent Change From Military Aid to No Military Aid Across All Levels
of Political Rights

Table 3.9 presents the predicted probabilities of U.S. yes votes at different levels
of per capita GDP and respect for political rights. The difference in the probability of
U.S. support between countries at the lowest level of economic development that do
respect political rights and countries also at the lowest level of economic development
but do not respect political rights is negative 15 percent. However, the difference in U.S.
support between countries that are at the highest level of economic development and
respect political rights and countries that are also at the highest level of economic
development but do not respect political rights is negative 33 percent. The difference of
18 percent shows that the least economically developed countries are more likely to
garner U.S. support in the MDBs compared to the most economically developed
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countries even if both have the same record on political rights. This shows that the level
of development seems to take higher priority than human rights for the U.S. in
determining whether to vote in favor of proposals in the MDBs.

Table 3.9 Predicted Probability at each level of Political rights and Level of
Development
Level of Level of Level
Dev1 (- Dev2 (of
Level of
Level of
Dev4 (1
Dev5 (2
Political
2 std
1 std
Dev3
Difference
Rights
Dev)
Dev)
(mean)
std Dev)
std Dev)
(1-5)
1

0.9736

0.9653

0.9543

0.9402

0.9220

5%

2

0.9631

0.9515

0.9365

0.9173

0.8930

7%

3

0.9485

0.9327

0.9124

0.8868

0.8550

9%

4

0.9286

0.9072

0.8803

0.8469

0.8063

12%

5

0.9018

0.8735

0.8385

0.7962

0.7461

16%

6

0.8663

0.8298

0.7857

0.7339

0.6748

19%

7

0.8206

0.7749

0.7214

0.6607

0.5943

23%

Difference (17)

15%

19%

23%

28%

33%

Figure 3.7 presents the changes in the likelihood of U.S. support graphically from
the lowest level of economic development to the highest level of development for each
level of respect for political rights. As can be seen, at level one of political rights the
change in level of development only has a five percent effect on the probability of U.S.
support. On the other hand, at level seven of political rights the change in level of
development has a 23 percent effect on the probability of U.S. support.
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Figure 3.7 Percent Change Across Level of Development and Political Rights

Results Without Worst Violators of Political Rights
Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probabilities of a U.S. yes vote across the seven
categories of the political rights variable. The slope declines greatly from level six to
level seven giving an indication that it is level seven that is driving a lot of the
significance of the variable. Rerunning the model removing all level seven observations
of the political rights variable (POL = 7) provides a means of examining how much of the
significance is determined by those observations. Table 3.10 shows the frequency for
each level of the political rights variable. There are only 817 observations at level seven
out of 9,300 total which comprises only seven percent of the total observations.
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Table 3.10 Frequencies of Political Rights

Political Rights
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Frequency
848
2,275
2,012
898
831
1,619
817

Percent
9.12
24.46
21.63
9.66
8.94
17.41
8.78

Total

9,300

100

Table 3.11 shows the descriptive statistics for the model without level seven of
the political rights variable. The median for the political rights variable is 3. The mode
for military aid is 1, while the mean for UN voting similarity is 31%. The median for
level of trade is $2,565.7 US millions and the median for level of development is
$2160.55 in per capita GDP in $US.

Table 3.11 Descriptive Statistics for Model Without Worst Violators of Political
Rights
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Median

Mode

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

POL

8483

3.406224

3

3

1.648853

1

6

PI

8408

3.165794

3

3

0.929211

1

5

MILAID

8563 0.8440967

1

1

0.3627848

0

1

UNVOTE

8427

31.02453

24

0

22.51905

0

100

TRADE

8421

16721.23

2565.7

20721.12

51573.37

0

367161.7

DEV

8416

3134.478

2160.55

5325.82

3116.439

82.64 32926.95
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Table 3.12 shows that the political rights variable, level of trade variable, and
level of development variable are all significant at the 0.001 level, while voting similarity
in the UN variable is significant at the 0.01 level and the military aid variable is also
significant at the 0.01 level. As was the case in the full model, the rights of personal
integrity variable is not significant. The coefficient for political rights is -0.23, which
means that for every one-unit increase in political rights disrespect the likelihood of a
U.S. yes vote decreases by 0.23. The coefficient for military aid is 0.59 that means that
for countries that receive U.S. military aid the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote increases by
0.59. The coefficient for level of trade is 0.20, which means that for every one-unit
increase in level of trade the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote increases by 0.20. The
coefficient for level of development is -0.43. That means that for every one-unit increase
in level of development the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote decreases by 0.43. Finally,
although the UN vote variable is significant the coefficient is again quite small at -0.01,
which is effect means the variable has minimal impact on the likelihood of the U.S.
voting yes.
The odds ratio for the significant variables is as follows: for the political rights
variable the odds ratio is 0.80 meaning a one-unit increase in disrespect for political
rights lowers the odds of a U.S. yes vote to 0.8 to 1. In terms of percent change in the
odds ratio there is a negative 20 percent change. This means that the chance for a U.S.
yes vote decreases by 20 percent for a one-unit increase in disrespect for political rights.
The odds ratio for military aid is 1.80 which means that the odds of the U.S. voting in
favor of loans for a country that receives U.S. military aid is 1.80 to 1 for a change of 80
percent. The odds ratio for level of trade is 1.22 to 1 meaning a one-unit increase in level
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of trade increases odds of a U.S. yes vote to 1.22 to 1, which is a change of 22 percent.
The odds ratio for level of development is 0.65, which means that for a one-unit increase
in the level of development the odds of a U.S. yes vote decrease to 0.65 to 1 or a change
of negative 35 percent. Finally, the odds ratio for UN voting similarity is 0.99 to 1
meaning for a one-unit increase in the level of voting similarity between the U.S. and
other countries increase the odds of U.S. supporting that country in the MDBs declines to
0.99 to 1 for a change of -0.01 percent. In actuality UN voting similarity has no effect on
U.S. voting in the MDBs.

Table 3.12 Results for Model Without Worst Violators of Political Rights

POL
PI
MILAID
UNVOTE
(ln)TRADE
(ln)DEV

Log Odds
-0.225***
(0.050)
-0.112
(0.094)
0.586**
(0.225)
-0.0101**
(0.0033)
0.202***
(0.0460)
-0.428***
(0.0974)

Odds ratio
0.799***
(0.0403)
0.894
(0.0845)
1.80**
(0.404)
0.990**
(0.0033)
1.22***
(0.0563)
0.652***
(0.0635)

Percent
change
-21.1
-10.6
80.0
-0.01
22.0
-34.8

Two interesting things stand out comparing the log odds and odds ratio of the full
model to the model that excludes the worst violators of political rights. First are the
effects that level seven of the political rights variable has. Comparing the odds ratio of
the political rights variable in the full model (0.706) to the odds ratio in the model
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without the level seven observations of the political rights variable (0.799) there is a
change of 0.093, or almost 10 percent. In effect, the worst violators of political rights
account for almost 10 percent of the effect of the political rights variable on the
likelihood of U.S. voting yes in the MDBs. The conclusion one can draw from this is that
the U.S. strongly works against the worst violators of political rights in the MDBs. The
other interesting conclusion from comparing the full model to the reduced model is the
fact that level of trade is now significant in the latter. In the full model level of trade is
not significant and the odds ratio for the variable is 1.036 to 1 or essentially 1 to 1, which
means that the variable has no substantive impact on the odds of the U.S. voting yes in
the MDBs. The level of trade variable in the reduced model is significant at the
0.001level and the odds ratio is 1.22 to 1. This means that a one-unit increase in level of
trade increases the odds of U.S. support also increases by 18 percent.
Finally, one interesting note is that roughly half of the level seven observations of
the political rights variable are for just one country: China. Table 3.13 shows the
breakdown for all level seven observations. As can be seen China accounts for 315 of the
809 observations or 39 percent. An interesting possibility is that it is not necessarily the
level seven observations that are driving so much of the significance but perhaps it can
just be attributed to the large number of votes for China. The next section will present
the logit estimation without China
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Table 3.13 Political Rights Level Seven Observations
Year
Country
Belarus
Central
African
Republic
Chad
China
Cote d’
Ivoire
Eq Guinea
Eritrea
Haiti
Iraq
Laos
Myanmar
S Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Zimbabwe
Total

2004
0

2005
10

2006
4

2007
12

2008
8

2009
8

Total
42

1
0
43

0
0
62

0
0
60

0
0
59

0
0
44

0
6
47

1
6
315

0
1
4
0
1
7
0
1
6
0
0
0
3
12
17
0
96

0
2
1
16
3
19
6
2
2
0
0
0
2
9
31
4
169

0
0
2
15
0
15
0
2
1
0
0
0
1
9
21
2
132

0
0
1
7
0
10
1
1
1
0
0
0
4
10
25
0
131

10
4
3
0
0
15
2
1
3
1
4
0
2
10
28
0
136

8
1
1
0
0
11
0
1
3
1
0
12
6
10
28
3
146

18
8
12
38
4
77
9
8
16
2
4
12
18
60
150
9
809

Results Without China
The descriptive statistics for the model without China can be found in Table 3.14.
As with the previous models the median for the political rights variable and the physical
integrity variables is three. The mode for military aid is one, while the mean for UN
voting similarity is 24 percent. Finally, the median for level of trade is $2,457.99 in US
millions, while the median for level of development is $2,020.58 per capita GDP. The
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results for the model without China are presented in Table 3.15. As can be seen all the
variables are significant except for the rights of personal integrity variable. The effect of
each variable on the likelihood of a U.S. yes vote can be discerned from the odds ratios.
The odds ratios for the model without China are very similar to the odds ratios for the
model absent the worst violators of political rights. For example, the odds ratio for the
model without China is 0.804 to 1 for a percent change in the odds ratio of -19.6 percent.
The odds ratio for the model absent the worst violators of political rights is 0.799 to 1 for
a percent change in the odds ratio of -21.1 percent. What this shows is that just one
country, China, has a significant effect on the likelihood of the U.S. voting yes for
proposals in the MDBs. Again, the level of trade is also significant in this model in
contrast to the full model.

Table 3.14 Descriptive Statistics for Model without China

Variable

Obs.

Mean

Median

Mode

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

POL

8985

3.607012

3

3

1.802262

1

7

PI

8907

3.176401

3

3

0.9168169

1

5

9064 0.8257944

1

1

0.3793071

0

1

24

0

22.65432

0

100

0

367161.7

MILAID

UNVOTE 8919

30.04674

TRADE

8883

16096.63

2457.99 20721.12

50313.16

DEV

8905

3047.021

2020.58

3098.601

5325.82

82.64 32926.95
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Table 3.15 Results for Model Without China

POL
PI
MILAID
UNVOTE
(ln)TRADE
(ln)DEV

Log Odds

Odds Ratio

Percent Change

-.218***

.804***

-19.6

(.0421)

(.0339)

-.132

0.876

(.0887)

(.0776)

0.593**

1.81**

(.1864)

(.3374)

-.010**

.990**

(.0033)

(.0033)

0.205***

1.23***

(.0418)

(.0512)

-.440***

.644***

(.0902)

(.0581)

-12.4
81.0
-.01
23.0
-35.6

Summary of Results
In conclusion, the hypothesis that human rights influence U.S. votes in the MDBs
receives mixed support. Countries’ respect for political rights influences U.S. voting in
the MDBs, but respect for the rights of personal integrity have no effect on U.S. voting in
the MDBs. Moving to strategic interests, whether a country receives military aid from
the U.S. has a major impact on whether the U.S. supports loans to that country in the
MDBs. However, although voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN was significant, the
coefficient was not in the hypothesized direction and the effect of the variable was not
apparent. The impact of economic factors on U.S. voting in the MDBs was also mixed.
The volume of trade a country had with the U.S. was not significant in the full model and
did not have an effect on whether the U.S. was more likely to support loans to that
country. However, the level of development of the recipient country was a significant
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factor and in the hypothesized direction. In other words, the U.S. was more likely to vote
for loans going to countries that were on the lower end of the economic development
spectrum than those that were on the relative high end.
Since human rights were the main variable under consideration in this study it is
also important to acknowledge how human rights influenced U.S. voting behavior in
specific strategic and economic development contexts. Those countries that received
U.S. military aid but had a poor political rights record were more likely to receive U.S.
support in the MDBs by 22 percent than those countries that also had poor political rights
record but did not receive U.S. military aid. Also those countries that had a poor political
rights record but where also on the lowest end of the development spectrum where more
likely by 23 percent to garner U.S. support in the MDBs than those countries that were on
the relatively higher end of the development spectrum and also did not respect political
rights. The quantitative examination of U.S. votes in the MDBs highlights the
importance of respect for political rights, whether the country receives U.S. military aid
or not, and whether the country is at a low level of economic development in determining
whether the U.S. will support proposals for those countries in the MDBs. Finally, the
results also show that the significance of the political rights variable is largely driven by
the worst offenders (POL =7) and in particular China. To determine more specifically
what factors influence U.S. voting in the MDBs the next chapter will look specifically at
which countries the U.S. voted against in the MDBs and for what reasons.
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CHAPTER 4: REASON CODE ANALYSIS

The previous chapter presented the results from the logit estimation of U.S. votes
in the MDBs. The results showed that a country’s support for political rights was a
significant determinant of whether the U.S. would vote in favor of proposals for that
country. Of particular importance was that the likelihood of a U.S. yes votes was greatly
impacted by whether the country was one of the worst violators of political rights.
Whether a country received military aid from the U.S. was also a significant predictor of
a U.S. yes vote. Finally, a country’s level of development was a significant predictor of
U.S. voting to approve proposals in the MDBs. The previous chapter’s examination of
voting data highlights important trends on how human rights and other factors influence
U.S. voting in the MDBs, but it lacks specifics regarding variation in U.S. voting
behavior across countries and specific human rights issues. This chapter addresses those
concerns by examining the reason codes published by the Treasury Department along
with the voting data. The reason codes are references to specific legislation, which
requires the U.S. Executive Director (USED) to vote no on proposals for specific reasons.
There are 64 reason codes (See Appendix) 22 of which deal with human rights.
The rest of this chapter lays out the evidence from the analysis of the reason
codes. It begins with a section on the U.S. MDB policymaking process (i.e. the voting
decision process). The next two sections break the human rights reason codes down into
three categories: general human rights code, specific human rights codes, and country
specific codes, and describes what the legislation referenced by the codes mandates the
USED to do. The next section addresses in total how many human rights codes have
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been applied. The following section includes the human rights reason codes broken down
by year and specific code. The next three sections present the number of general human
rights codes, specific human rights codes, and country specific codes applied,
respectively. This is followed by a section that identifies which countries have had the
most codes applied to them and which codes in particular. The final section looks at the
reason codes applied to China and also includes a description of overall U.S. policy
towards China in the MDBs since the 1980s.

U.S. MDB Policy Making Process
The U.S. exerts a considerable amount of influence in the MDBs through both
formal and informal means. Several studies have shown that the U.S. has been
particularly successful in affecting MDB activities through informal channels involving
staffing decisions and choice of leadership (Babb 2009; Andersen et al 2006; Woods
2003; Wade 2002). This section will focus exclusively on the influence exerted through
formal means, particularly through the voting structure of the MDBs
The U.S. is represented in the MDBs in both the Board of Governors and the
Board of Directors. The front line in the relationship between the U.S. and the MDBs,
however, is in the Board of Directors. The U.S. Executive Director represents the
interests of the U.S. in the Board of Directors (the Treasury Secretary represents the U.S.
in the Board of Governors) and is responsible for casting votes on behalf of the U.S. The
USEDs have been described as the “eyes, ears, and voices of the United States within
those organizations [MDBs].” (Sanford 2001b) The President appoints the USEDs and
they report, through the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, to the Treasury
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Department. The Treasury Department has been delegated responsibility over U.S.
participation in the MDBs. The day-to-day management issues are handled by the Office
of Multilateral Development Banking, which consists of a small staff of roughly 20
individuals and led by a director who reports to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Development Finance and Debt (Upton 2000). In recent years, however,
the staffing level has dropped to only five full time and five part time people involved
with MDB issues in the Treasury Department (Treasury Department Interview 2011).
Although the Treasury Department has the lead in MDB operations, it is not the
only Executive Branch agency with influence over MDB policy. The Treasury
Department leads a weekly inter-agency meeting called the Working Group on
Multilateral Assistance (WGMA) in which other government agencies can weigh in on
MDB policy. The WGMA reviews the loan packages on which the USED will have to
vote to determine if the loans are consistent with U.S. policy and U.S. law. The WGMA
then sends its recommendations on to the Treasury, which in turn sends them to the
USEDs. Participants in the WGMA include officials from the Treasury, State,
Agriculture and Commerce Departments as well as representatives from USAID, Federal
Reserve, and Export-Import Bank (Sanford 2001b).
The State Department, and specifically the Office of Development Finance,
reviews MDB loan proposals to determine if they are in line with current U.S. human
rights policy and law (State Department Interview 2011). In addition to the weekly
WGMA there is also a monthly meeting with staff from the Treasury and State
Departments, USAID and various NGOs. The Bank Information Center (BIC) a
watchdog group that monitors the projects and policies of the World Bank and other
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international financial institutions organizes the meeting. The agenda of the meetings is
set by the BIC and other NGOs represented but the focus is often on the environmental
and humanitarian issues associated with MDB lending. This monthly meeting allows
NGOs some space to voice their concerns regarding MDB policy and lending decisions
to those responsible for formulating U.S. MDB voting decisions (State Department
Interview 2011).
Congress also plays a role in formulating U.S. policy in the MDBs. In general,
Congress sets the broad outlines for U.S. policy while the Executive (primarily the
Treasury) has responsibility for managing the details of that policy (Sanford 1982). There
are two basic ways for Congress to set MDB policy: through the use of substantive
legislation which attempts to control the “voice and vote” of the U.S. in the MDBs, and;
appropriations legislation that uses the “power of the purse” to set the U.S. contribution
limits to the MDBs (Sanford 1988). Decisions made regarding MDB contributions are
situated within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House
Financial Services Committee. The use of substantive legislation creates obligations for
the USEDs to vote against certain loan packages or loans to certain countries, or at
minimum express reservations regarding the proposal or the county that is receiving it.
Congress has used both substantive and appropriations legislation to address human
rights issues over fifteen times since the passage of the IFI Act in 1977.
One of the major limitations on the ability of Congress to use legislation,
especially substantive legislation, to impact U.S. policy toward the MDBs is oversight of
the implementation of that legislation. There is an inherent tension between the Executive
Branch and Congress in the implementation of foreign policy and multilateral aid policy
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is no exception. For example, section 701 of the IFI act mandating that the U.S. use its
“voice and vote” to steer loans away from states that violate human rights was a point of
contention between the Carter administration and Congress as well as the Reagan
administration and Congress (Forsythe 1987). Legislation passed by Congress is
implemented by the Executive Branch agencies, and with the case of the MDBs by the
Treasury Department. Congress is at an information disadvantage in relation to the
Executive, and the MDBs themselves, since the USED reports directly to the Treasury
department. To rectify some of this information asymmetry Congress has required the
Treasury department to report periodically with specific information on MDB activities
and U.S. votes.

Human Rights Legislation
General and Specific Human Rights Reason Codes
The human rights category is comprised of 22 reason codes that derive from 15
pieces of legislation (see Table 4.1). The human rights reason codes can be broken down
into three categories. The first is called the general human rights category and contains
only one code. This category includes only the general human rights provision of Sec.
701 of the 1977 International Financial Institutions Act. This section requires the USEDs
to vote against proposals going to countries that systematically violate the human rights
of their citizens. More specifically, the general human rights provision of the IFI act
states that the US is to vote against loans going to countries that engage in “torture or
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without
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charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person” (IFI Act 1977,
Sec 701).
Table 4.1 Human Rights Legislation
Public Law

Description

P.L. 95-118, Sec 701

Human Rights – use voice and vote to steer loans away from
countries that consistently engage in “torture or cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges, or other flagrant denial to life,
liberty, and the security of person.” Unless the assistance
contributes to basic human needs.
Harboring indictees for war crimes

P.L. 107-115, Sec. 581
(b-d)
P.L. 104-208, 570(a)(2)
P.L. 108-447, Sec.
554(a)
P.L. 109-102, Sec.
561(a)(1)
P.L. 100-202, Sec.
406(1)
P.L. 104-208, Sec. 579
P.L. 105-292, Title V,
Sec. 402, 405(12) and
422
P.L. 106-386, Sec 110
P.L. 107-99
P.L. 109-102
P.L. 109-102, Sec 563
P.L. 107-245
P.L. 108-61
P.L. 111-117

Policy Towards Burma (human rights/democratic
government)
Government of Cambodia – assistance supports basic human
needs, assistance does not support basic human needs
Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees – exceptions or
waiver authority not applied, exceptions or waiver authority
applies
Worker Rights
Female Genital Mutilation
Religious Persecution – assistance supports basic human
needs, assistance does not support basic human needs
Trafficking in Persons, assistance supports one or more
specified exceptions, assistance does not qualify under any
specified exception
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
Zimbabwe
Serbia – certified, not certified
Sudan Peace Act section 6(b)(2) (2002).
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
Sri Lanka – assistance supports basic human needs,
assistance does not support basic human needs

The second category is specific human rights violations and contains nine codes.
This category includes legislation that requires the USED to use its “voice and vote” to
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steer MDB proposals away from countries that violate specific human rights. The
specific rights in question include failure to apprehend war criminals, violating worker’s
rights, female gentile mutilation, religious persecution, and allowing human trafficking.
With regard to apprehending war criminals there are two pieces of legislation in question:
the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2002 specifically section 581 (b-d) and the Foreign
Appropriations Act of 2006 specifically sections 561(a)(1), which deal with the harboring
of war criminals and the failure to apprehend war criminals respectively. These pieces of
legislation came about in the aftermath of the wars in the Balkans. The U.S. Congress
felt that countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia were dragging
their feet in cooperating with the ICTY and inactively searching for war criminals that
may have been living within their borders. Both pieces of legislation require the
Secretary of State to make the determination as to whether these countries have taken the
necessary steps to meet their international obligations regarding apprehending war
criminals and cooperation with the ICTY. In addition, the Secretary of State can waive
the prohibition if the assistance is humanitarian, supports democratization, or if it directly
supports the implementation of the Dayton Accords.
Another specific type of human right represented with a reason code is the rights
of workers. The Foreign Appropriations Act of 1988, specifically section 406 (1)
required the USED to vote against loans to countries which violate worker’s rights by
denying their ability to form independent labor unions.
The legislative prohibition on female genital mutilation stems from the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, specifically section 579, which has two
components. The USED is to use its “voice and vote” to oppose any loan going to
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countries where (1) female genital mutilation is common practice and the country (2) has
not taken steps to implement educational programs to help prevent the practice of female
genital mutilation. The prohibition does not prevent the USED from voting for loans
going to countries where female genital mutilation occurs. It only requires that the
USED vote to prevent loans going to those countries where the practice occurs and they
are not actively trying to reduce it through educational programs.
An additional specific human rights legislative prohibition includes repression of
religious freedom. In 1998 Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA), which was intended to make support for religious freedom a core component of
U.S. foreign policy. The IRFA established various entities required to monitor religious
freedom around the world including the Office of International Religious Freedom. This
office is charged with designating specific countries as a Country of Particular Concern
(CPC) if they commit “systematic, ongoing and egregious violations of religious
freedom.” (IRFA 1998) The IRFA gives the President a number of tools to deal with
countries that are deemed to be of particular concern for their denial of religious freedom.
Those tools include public condemnation, denial of public visits, and more consequential
tools such as withdrawal of financial assistance. This of course includes the ability to
direct the USED to use its voice and vote to steer funds away from those countries that
severely violate religious freedom. The IRFA was later amended to allow the President
to waive punishment for religious freedom violators if it was believed that doing so was
necessary for national security or in the interest of religious freedom.
The final specific human rights legislative prohibition is human trafficking. The
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), passed in 2000, mandates
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that the U.S. will not provide assistance to countries that fail to comply with minimum
standards for the elimination of human trafficking or, at a minimum, are not working
towards such ends. The exception to the prohibition includes assistance for humanitarian
or trade related issues (VTVPA 2000). The mechanics of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act are similar to the International Religious Freedom Act. The
VTVPA requires the State Department to annually a list of countries that are failing to
meet the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking and are also failing at
working towards compiling with the minimum standards. The President is then required
to direct the USED to use its voice and vote to steer funds away from those countries that
violate the act. However, much like the IRFA, there are certain conditions under which
the President can exercise some waiver authority in implementing the provisions of the
VTVPA. For instance, the President can waive the prohibition if the assistance to the
country is deemed to be in the U.S. national interest or if the country is already subject to
other human rights prohibitions, thereby making the current prohibition redundant.

Country Specific Human Rights Reason Codes
The third human rights reason code category is country specific legislation. This
category includes legislation requiring the USEDs to vote against loans going to Burma,
Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Serbia, Sudan, and, as of 2009, Sri Lanka. The reason for the
legislation varies depending on the country and includes general issues such as promoting
democratic reforms, as well as specific measures such as apprehending war criminals.
There are two separate pieces of legislation governing U.S. policy toward Burma in the
MDBs, the 1997 Consolidated Appropriations Act specifically sec 570(a)(2), and the
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Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA) of 2003. The first piece of legislation
prevents votes for proposals going to Burma until it makes progress on implementing
democratic reforms and improving human rights practices. The legislation requires that
the USED continue to vote against proposals for Burma until the President certifies to
Congress that the Burmese government has successfully moved forward in implementing
democratic reforms. The President can also waive the prohibition if the assistance will
contribute to U.S. national security. Finally, the statute also allows for waiver of the
prohibition if the assistance is for humanitarian needs, counter-narcotic assistance, crop
substitution assistance, or promotes human rights or democracy in Burma (Consolidated
Appropriations Act 1997, Sec 570(a)(2)).
The second piece of legislation, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
(BFDA), specifically acknowledges that the U.S. will recognize the National League of
Democracy (NLD) as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people and not the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the current ruling junta of Burma. Also,
the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act lays out specific measures the Burmese
government must take before the U.S. will support loans to Burma in the MDBs.
Specifically they include measureable progress on reducing the incidents of rape,
violations of workers rights including using forced and child labor, releasing all political
prisoners, allowing freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of association, freedom
of religion, and transition to civilian government through democratic elections (BFDA
2003).
Another country specific legislative prohibition is found in the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) of 2001. The Act requires the USED
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to vote against proposals going to Zimbabwe until the President certifies that the rule of
law has been restored in Zimbabwe including, “respect for ownership and title to
property, freedom of speech and association, and an end to the lawlessness, violence, and
intimidation sponsored, condoned, or tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe, the
ruling party, and their supporters or entities” (ZDERA 2001). The legislation also calls
on Zimbabwe to conduct free and fair Presidential elections along with other reforms
regarding the distribution of land, ending its involvement in the war in the Congo, and
bringing the military under civilian control.
In addition, there are legislative prohibitions preventing the USED from voting
for proposals going to Cambodia. The prohibition was amended in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act in 2005, specifically section 554(a), to allow for approval only of
funds that would go to local governments in Cambodia, or NGOs working in Cambodia,
but not to the central government. The legislation has a basic human needs exemption
and also provides for exemptions for education and basic healthcare programs, rule of
law programs, counter-narcotics programs, and programs that aim to combat human
trafficking (Consolidated Appropriations Act 2005, Sec 554(a)). The intentions of the
legislative prohibitions are multipurpose but are mainly intended to put pressure on the
Cambodian government to cooperate with the hybrid tribunal prosecuting individuals for
crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge era. The legislation requires that the
Secretary of State provide assurances that the Cambodian judicial system is adequate in
terms of independence and adherence to international standards of justice and fairness
(Lum 2007).
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There are also legislative prohibitions against voting for proposals involving the
government of Serbia. Section 563 of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 2006 requires
that before the USED can support loans to Serbia the President must certify that Serbia is
cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The
certification takes place each year after May 31st. Cooperation entails access for
investigators, the provision of documents, and the surrender of those under indictment or,
at minimum, help in providing their apprehension. The legislation specifically mentions
that both Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic must be apprehended.4 The legislation
also says that before the President can certify Serbia the government must no longer be
providing support to Bosnian Serb institutions and must have begun implementation of
laws meant to protect ethnic minorities (Foreign Appropriations Act 2006, Sec 563).
Loans going for humanitarian needs or pro-democracy aid are not subject to the
prohibition.
The prohibition preventing the USED from voting for proposals going to the
Sudan stemmed from the ongoing human rights abuses committed by the Sudanese
government. The Sudan Peace Act was passed in 2001 and contained a variety of
provisions for the U.S. government to undertake to pressure the Sudanese government to
stem the atrocities it was committing, including genocide and slavery. The legislative
language directing the USED to oppose loans to Sudan in the Sudan Peace Act is slightly
different than the other pieces of legislation. The normal language used is for the USEDs
to use their “voice and vote” to deny loans to specific countries. The Sudan Peace Act
however uses arguably stronger language. It states that the USED is to “continue to vote

4

Both were eventually arrested, Ratko Mladic in 2011 and Radovan Karadzic in 2008
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against and actively oppose any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit,
or guarantee to the Government of Sudan.” (Sudan Peace Act 2001, Sec. 6(b)(2)) The
difference is in the use of the language of “voice and vote” in the other legislation vs. the
“vote against and actively oppose” language of the Sudan Peace Act, the latter is
arguably stronger and more forceful than the former. The Sudan Peace Act also requires
the Treasury Secretary to issue semi-annual reports to the requisite Congressional
committees on the steps taken by the USED in opposing a loan, credit, or guarantee to
Sudan. Humanitarian assistance is exempt from the prohibition as is aid going to areas
beyond the control of the Sudanese central government.
Finally, in the case of Sri Lanka the prohibition stems from the treatment of
refugees and internally displaced people following the government’s final defeat of the
Tamil tigers in 2009. The 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, specifically section
7089, states that the USED must vote against any loan, agreement, or other form of
financial assistance to the Sri Lankan government unless the Secretary of State affirms
that the government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to account for the atrocities committed
in putting down the Tamil Tigers. Specifically, the Secretary of State must certify that
the government of Sri Lanka is taking steps to bring to justice members of the military
who have allegedly violated international humanitarian and human rights law; that the
government is respecting international human rights law including rights of due process,
freedom of the press and assembly; that it is treating internally displaced people in
accordance with international standing by guaranteeing their freedom of movement,
providing access to humanitarian organizations, and accounting for persons detained in
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the conflict; and finally, that the government is promoting policies that are aimed at
reconciliation and justice (Consolidated Appropriations Act 2010, Sec. 7089 (4)(e)).

Reason Code Description
Overall Use of Reason Codes
Over the period from 2004 – 2009 the U.S. assigned 534 votes a human rights
reason code. By way of comparison, 224 votes were assigned a transparency reason code,
237 were assigned an environmental reason code, and 607 proposals were assigned an
economic code (see Figure 4.1). These constitute just over five, two, two, and six percent
of the total U.S. votes in the MDBs respectively (see Figure 4.2). Overall votes with
reason codes constitute about 16 percent of the total U.S. votes (see Figure 4.3). As was
mentioned in chapter three, only thirteen percent of U.S. votes were no or abstain votes
(1,313 out of 9,766 total votes, see Figure 4.4). U.S. law requires the Treasury
Department and the USED to provide a reason for why they vote no or abstain from
voting. Hence the reason codes provide the official reason why the U.S. is voting no or
abstaining. The Treasury and USED are not required to provide a reason for why they
vote yes; so for the most part the number of reason codes should correlate with the
number of no/abstain votes. The discrepancy between the 13 percent of no/abstain votes
and the 16 percent of total votes with reason codes can be accounted for by the basic
human needs exemption or what is otherwise known as the “needy people clause”
(Apodaca 2005).
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The purpose of the basic human needs exemption is to allow aid to go to countries
if it directly benefits needy people. A foreign aid official once described the purpose of
the basic human needs exemption as, “Why should the poor be twice penalized . . .once
by their government torturing and repressing them, and then by the U.S. by depriving
them economic aid?” (quoted in Apodaca 2005: 67). Of the 15 pieces of legislation that
require the USED to vote no on projects to countries that violate human rights, seven
include basic human needs exemptions. Of those 534 votes assigned a human rights
code, 133 were basic human needs exceptions. Therefore 401 votes were either no votes
or abstentions for human rights reasons (See Figure 4.5).

Basic Human
Needs (133
codes); 25%

Non‐Basic Human
Needs (401
codes); 75%

Basic Human Needs (133
codes)
Non‐Basic Human Needs (401
codes)

Figure 4.5 Basic Human Needs Codes
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Human Rights Reason Codes by Year and Code
Table 4.2 shows the human rights reason codes broken down by year and specific
reason code. From 2004 to 2009 the use of human rights reason codes has varied
considerably, peaking in 2005 with 124 codes and declining steadily to only 55 codes in
2009. In 2004 the number of human rights codes used was 90 and in 2006 and 2007 the
number was 96. 2007 and 2008 represent a significant decline in the use of human rights
codes with 73 and 55 codes used, respectively. The first year of the Obama
administration saw a large decrease in the use of human rights reason codes from the
previous years under the Bush administration.

The year-to-year variation in human

rights codes has many potential explanations. One explanation could be that the total
number of votes per year have gone down so correspondingly the number of human
rights codes applied has gone down as well. As seen in Figure 4.6, this is not the case.
The total number of votes per year has varied between almost 1,400 votes in 2004 to a
high of 1,742 in 2007 and back down to 1,669 in 2009. The point however, is that as the
number of human rights codes declined significantly in 2008 and 2009 the number of
total votes in the MDBs was roughly equal to the previous years, excluding 2004.
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Figure 4.6 Numbers of Votes per Year
The decline in the number of human rights codes as compared to the number of
total votes in the last two years can be seen more vividly when looking at human rights
codes as a percentage of the overall votes each year. Figure 4.7 shows a fairly steep
decline in human rights codes as a percentage of overall votes. The highpoint was in
2004 and 2005 when human rights codes reached 6.47 and 7.67 percent of overall votes,
respectively. In 2006 and 2007 the numbers dropped to 5.63 and 5.51 percent,
respectively. In 2008 the number again dropped to 4.45 percent followed by a big drop in
2009 down to just 3.3 percent of total votes. The decline in the number of human rights
codes in total and as a percentage of overall votes begs an important question: whether
the decline is the result of a policy shift by the U.S., or attributed to the fact that the type
of country that was seeking loans from the MDBs those years generally had a better
human rights record? To examine the second point it is necessary to get a picture of the
overall human rights record of recipient countries for each year.
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Figure 4.7 Percentages of Votes with Human Rights Reason Code per Year

Figure 4.8 shows the average political rights (POL) score for each year under
study. There is some variation in the average score across the years. The scale ranges
from 1-7 with 7 indicating extreme repression on political rights. The range of scores
goes from a high of 4.1 in 2005 to a low of 3.7 in 2007. The average scores from 2004,
2008, and 2009 are 3.9, 3.8, and 3.9 respectively. Figure 4.9 shows the average personal
integrity rights (PI) score for each year under study. In contrast to the political rights
scores there is almost no variation in the physical integrity score across the years. The
rights of personal integrity scores range from 1-5 with 5 indicating extreme repression on
physical integrity rights. The average score for each year is 3.2, except 2008 with an
average score of 3.1. A positive increase in the human rights record of countries seeking
loans in the MDBs does not seem to be the cause of the decline in the number of human
rights codes in 2008 and 2009. As a crude correlation the variation in average political
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rights scores does not really track the decline in human rights codes in 2008 and 2009,
but on the other hand does track the increase in codes use in 2004. The decrease in
human rights codes in 2008 and 2009 also does not track with the average rights of
personal integrity score since the average score is essentially unchanged.
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General Human Rights Code
Examining the three areas of human rights codes (general human rights provision,
specific human rights violations, and country specific legislation) one can see that the
general human rights provision has been utilized the most. As Table 4.2 shows, the
general human rights code was used 297 times over the six years, which accounts for
roughly 56 percent of the human rights codes applied. 107 of the general human rights
codes were human needs exemptions where the USED actually voted for the proposal
since it helped support basic human needs. If the proposal was for a project that did not
support basic human needs the USED would have voted no based on the human rights
record of the recipient country. Figure 4.10 shows general human rights codes (including
the basic human needs exemption) as a percentage of all human rights codes used each
year. As a percentage of all human rights codes, the general human rights code increased
every year from a low of 44 percent in 2004 to a high of 72 percent in 2009, with a one
year dip in between from 59 percent in 2006 to 57 percent in 2007.
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Figure 4.10 General Human Rights Code as Percentage of All Human Rights Codes
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One interesting trend regarding the use of the general human rights code is the
increase in the use of the basic human needs exemption over the six years corresponding
with a decrease in use of the general human rights code. In 2004 the human needs
exemption of the general human rights code was only applied six times but it
subsequently increased every year, reaching 28 applications in 2009. Correspondingly,
the application of the general human rights code parallels the application of human rights
codes overall across the six years. It reached the highpoint in 2005 when it was applied
48 times and then decreased in 2008 and 2009 when it was used 21 times and 12 times,
respectively. As a percentage of the general human rights code basic human needs
exemptions have increased every year. As Figure 4.11 shows, the human needs
exemption has increased from 15 percent of general human rights codes in 2004 to 70
percent of general human rights codes in 2009 with a steady increase every year.
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Specific Human Rights Violations Codes and Country Specific Human Rights
Codes
Table 4.2 also presents the number of times the specific human rights violations
codes were applied as well as the number of times the country specific human rights
codes were applied. The failure to apprehend war criminals code was the most frequently
applied specific human rights violation code. It was applied 141 times over the past six
years and, additionally, the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption was applied 14
times. The trafficking in persons code was the second most applied specific human
rights violation code but it was only applied 21 times. The trafficking in persons
exemption was also applied three times. The only other specific human rights violations
reason codes applied were religious prosecution (five times), religious prosecution human
needs exemption (once), and violating worker rights (once).
As was mentioned above, the failure to apprehend war criminals legislation
specifically instructs the USED to vote against loans that go to countries that have not
taken steps to apprehend suspected war criminals and transfer them to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCY). The legislation also states that the
determination of whether or not a country has taken adequate steps to bring suspected
war criminals to the ITCY is to be determined by the Secretary of State (Foreign
Appropriations Act 2006, Section 563).

Looking at the use of the apprehending war

criminals code one can see a similar pattern in its application of the general human rights
code. Figure 4.12 shows the use of failure to apprehend war criminals code (including
the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption) as a percentage of total human rights
codes per year. As a percentage of the human rights codes used each year the failure to
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apprehend war criminals code (including the exemption) has increased each year from 24
percent in 2004 to 29 and 32 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively and then to a high of
41 percent in 2007. The percentage then begins to decline to 30 percent in 2008 and
precipitously declines to only four percent in 2009 with the code only applied twice in
that year.
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Figure 4.12 Failure to Apprehend War Criminals as Percentage of All Human
Rights Codes
Examining the country specific human rights codes one can seen that only a few
of them were applied over the six year period. The code that was applied the most is the
one specifically requiring Serbia to cooperate with the ITCY by apprehending war
criminals within its jurisdiction. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the Serbia code was only
used 13 times over six years with eleven of them used in 2004 alone. Including the basic
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human needs exemption; the code for Cambodia was used 14 times over six years with
all 14 of them used in 2004 and 2005. Following those two the next most frequently
applied codes were the two codes which reference Burma (six times for each), the code
for Sudan (applied 8 times), and the code for Sri Lanka (once) and Sri Lanka human
needs exemption (three times)
Table 4.2 Use of Human Rights Reason Codes (By specific code and year)
Total
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
General Human Rights
(7) General HR (Human
Needs)
6
12
16
21
24
28
107
(8) General HR
34
48
41
34
21
12
190
Specific Human Rights Violations
(12) War Crimes (Harboring)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(20) War Crimes (failure to
apprehend)
17
36
29
35
22
2
141
(43) War Crimes (Failure to
Apprehend-Exemption)
5
0
2
4
0
3
14
(21) Worker Rights
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
(22) FGM
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(28) Religious Persecution
(Human Needs)
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
(29) Religious Persecution
4
1
0
0
0
0
5
(40) Trafficking (Exemption)
1
2
0
0
0
0
3
(41) Trafficking
6
7
5
0
0
3
21
Specific Country Legislation
(13) Policy Towards Burma
(Human Rights/Democratic
Governance)
0
4
1
0
1
0
6
(14) Cambodia
5
4
0
0
0
0
9
(15) Cambodia (Human
Needs)
0
5
0
0
0
0
5
(45) Zimbabwe (Democracy
and Econ Recovery Act)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(46) Zimbabwe
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(47) Serbia
11
1
1
0
0
0
13
(48) Serbia (certified)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(52) Sudan
1
0
0
1
3
3
8
(53) Burma (freedom and dem
act)
0
4
1
0
1
0
6
(63) Sri Lanka (Human Needs)
0
0
0
0
0
3
3

126
(64) Sri Lanka
Total

0
90

0
124

0
96

0
96

0
73

1
55

1
534

Human Rights Codes by Country
The human rights codes broken down by country and specific codes are listed in
the appendix. Overall there are 23 countries (including a regional category which
includes loan proposals that cover more than one country) that have had human rights
reason codes applied to their loan proposal; just over 50 percent of these codes applied to
one country: China. 171 of these are the general human rights code, while 102 are in the
general human needs exemption category. The last two codes applied to China are in
reference to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. The reason this was applied to
China is because the proposed loan under consideration involved both China and Burma,
so the code applies to both countries. Therefore, the total number of human rights codes
applied to China from 2004 to 2009 was 275. Unfortunately, with the general human
rights provision the Treasury Department is not required to identify precisely why the
code was applied (e.g. torture, degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention,
etc).
In addition to China, the other countries to which at least one general human
rights code was applied (including the general human needs exemption) include: Burundi,
Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Regional, and Sudan. For most of
these countries the code was only applied a few times. The second most general human
rights codes applied to one country is Sudan with seven codes, two of which were basic
human needs exemptions, applied over six years. Figure 4.13 shows what percentage of

127
the general human rights codes usage each country accounted for from 2004-2009. As
can be seen, China accounts for over 90 percent of the general human rights codes
applied over the six-year period with the other countries only receiving negligible
amounts.
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Figure 4.13 Percentage of General Human Rights Codes per Country

The country with the second most human rights codes applied is Serbia with 101
codes. These codes deal exclusively with apprehending war criminals and complying
with the ICTY. 83 of the 101 codes, or 82 percent, are for failing to apprehend war
criminals. Another six were the failure to apprehend war criminals exemption. Finally,
the last 12 were for the country specific legislation that prohibits yes votes for loans
going to Serbia until the country begins adequately complying and working with the
ICTY. After China and Serbia there is a large drop off in countries with human rights
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codes applied by the U.S. The country with the third most codes is Bosnia with 34, all of
which deal with the failure to apprehend war criminals (with six exemptions) and also
one code for Serbia, which stems from a project in which both Serbia and Bosnia were
involved: hence the Serbia code applied to the vote. Sudan has the fourth most code
applications, which are spread out across various issues. Seven of the codes reference the
general human rights provision (two general human needs exemptions). One was for
failing to secure the rights of workers and another six were for religious persecution (with
one human needs exemption); four were for human trafficking (with one human needs
exemptions), and seven codes referenced the Sudan Peace Act. Sudan is unique among
the countries listed in that multiple codes were applied rather than just the general human
needs code.
The total number of votes for each country for each year is listed in the appendix.
As can be seen this measure varies widely. For example, the country with the most votes
and hence the most proposals in the MDBs is Russia with 505. On the other side of the
spectrum are places like Bahrain, the Canary Islands, and Dubai with only one vote each
over the entire period. Knowing the total number of votes for each country helps put the
application of human rights codes to any one country into better prospective. Figure 4.14
displays the number of human rights codes each country received as a percentage of their
overall votes in the MDBs. When looking at the prevalence of human rights codes as
percentage of votes for each country some interesting things stand out. For example,
China and Serbia have a high percentage of their overall votes assigned human rights
codes, 87 and 72 percent respectively. Perhaps more interesting are those countries that
did not have a lot of human rights codes applied overall, but as a percentage of the overall

129
votes for the country they were quite high. Examples of these countries include Bosnia
with 42 percent of its proposals having a human rights code, Iran with 50 percent, and
Venezuela with 47 percent. As far as total votes are concerned Bosnia had a total of 82
while Iran had a total of eight and Venezuela had a total of 19 (see appendix). Also of
note is the fact that for Burma and Sudan human rights codes represents 140 and 156
percent of their total votes respectively. The reason the number of human rights codes
exceeds the total number of votes is that multiple codes can be used as a reason for voting
against the proposal. Both Burma and the Sudan had relatively few votes overall with
only ten and 16, respectively.

Human Rights Codes as Percentage of All
Votes

Figure 4.14 Human Rights Codes as Percentage of All Votes
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Two things stand out when looking at the use of the human rights codes are the
number of general human rights codes applied to China, and the number of times the
failure to apprehend war criminals codes were used. There were 273 general human
rights codes applied to China, which represents 87 percent of their total votes. This puts
China far ahead as the country with the most human rights codes applied. The main
reason so many general human rights codes were applied to China is because China had
so many proposals going up for votes in the MDBs. China had the fourth most proposals
voted on by the U.S. with 315 (see appendix).
The focus on the apprehension of war criminals reflects the U.S. role in trying to
end the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. The use of the codes is spread across multiple
countries but is mostly focused on Serbia and to a lesser extent Bosnia. Since China
looms large in the discussion of human rights and U.S. voting in the MDBs it is necessary
to examine that relationship in more detail to determine why the U.S. has made it a
priority to consistently vote against proposals for China in the MDBs.

U.S. Foreign Policy and China in the MDBs
Overview of U.S. Foreign Policy towards China
In general terms the U.S. relationship with China has been very complex. On the
one hand, both countries view one another as strategic rivals; but on the other hand both
countries are deeply intertwined economically with each other. Regarding issues of
human rights, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and other issues requiring global
cooperation, China and the U.S. are often in opposition to one another. Much has been
written recently about the possible transition from American hegemony to Chinese
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hegemony and the potential for great power conflict between the two countries (Friedberg
2005; Christensen 2006; Friedberg 2011). In that sense it is useful to view the
relationship between the U.S. and China in the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank as one manifestation of the larger competition between the two countries.
Throughout history the relationship between hegemonic states and rising powers have
typically been uneasy and the relationship between China and the U.S. is no exception.
The relationship between the dominant power and the rising challenger is one of
competition that can manifest itself in various ways. Traditionally, competition was
centered on military and economic factors, which also characterize the current U.S. China
relationship, but there are more contemporary factors that also characterize their
competitive relationship, including human rights.
The U.S. has been very critical of China’s human rights record for decades.
China is important for the overall functioning of the global human rights regime because
of its economic, military, and demographic size (Foot 2000). China’s record on human
rights is also concerning for those who feel that the global human rights regime needs a
strong state to underlie its operation since the possibility of China displacing the U.S. as
the world’s most powerful country is a distinct possibility. This is problematic since
China has strongly adhered to traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty, which are
often anathema to the idea of universal human rights. The Chinese government
responding to international condemnation of its human rights records has often argued
that such criticism violates the norm of state sovereignty.
Despite the resistance of the Chinese government to human rights pressure it has
signed numerous international human rights treaties including the Convention Against
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Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the International Convention of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) among others. In addition, China has
also added changes to domestic law that include respect for human rights, most
importantly to its constitution. Some of the domestic laws for example, have to do with
regulations of the police and judicial system, reform of labor laws, rights to education,
and rights of ethnic minorities among others (Wan 2007). A rising middle class and
increased prominence at the international level are posited as explanations for the
Chinese government’s (at least superficial) legal embrace of some human rights treaties
and laws (Wan 2007). Regardless of these measures towards human rights that China has
made the U.S. continues to challenge China on its human rights record. This occurs not
only in voting against proposals for China in the MDBs but in a host of additional
economic sanctions as well (Rennack 2005).

Votes in the MDBs
As was seen above, votes for China in the MDBs received the most human rights
codes by the U.S. Just over 50 percent of the human rights codes applied were directed at
China. This number is reflective of the large volume of loans the Chinese bring forward
in the MDBs, but it also indicates that the U.S. is not squeamish about airing its
displeasure with the Chinese human rights record in a multilateral setting.

Overall there

were 275 human rights codes applied to votes for China from 2004-2009: 171 of the
codes were general human rights codes, 102 were human needs exemptions, and two of
the codes referenced the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act codes since the projects
under question involved regional projects between both China and Burma. In total, 87
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percent of U.S. votes for Chinese proposals in the MDBs had a human rights code
attached. In addition to the human rights codes, proposals from China had 155 codes
applied by the U.S for lack of transparency in military spending, 38 codes applied by the
U.S. for inadequate environmental protection, and seven codes applied by the U.S. for
economic reasons (see Table 4.3). The total number of codes applied to Chinese
proposals is 475 codes on 315 proposals.

Table 4.3 Number of Reason Codes Applied to Votes on China

Code

Applied

Human Rights

275

Transparency

155

Environment

38

Economic

7

Total

475

The transparency codes reference Section 576 of the Foreign Appropriations Act
of 1997 and Section 572 of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 1998. These sections
require the USEDs to vote against loans going to countries that do not have civilian
auditing procedures in place for funds going to the armed forces, and have not provided
requested audit information to the MDBs. The environmental codes refer to Sec 521 of
the International Development and Finance Act of 1989 and its subsequent amendments
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in further legislation. The original provision is known as the “Pelosi Amendment”,
which was introduced by Rep Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca). The Pelosi amendment requires the
U.S. to vote no on proposals in the MDBs that would have significant environmental
effects unless 120 days before the vote an environmental impact assessment has been
completed by the borrowing country and the specific MDB. In addition, the
environmental impact assessment must include possible alternatives to the proposed
project and it must be made available to the Executive Board of the institution before the
scheduled vote (USGAO 2001). The economic reason code does not refer to a specific
piece of legislation but is simply used to indicate that the U.S. voted no on a particular
proposal because it feels the project is of dubious economic value. This is a right each
member country of the Executive Board of each institution has under the Articles of
Agreement for each institution.
Overall, looking at U.S. votes on proposals brought forth by China one can see
clearly that the U.S. contests nearly every proposal that China brings forth in the MDBs.
In fact China is an automatic basic human needs vote for the U.S. in the MDBs. What
this means is that the U.S. will only support proposals for China if the proposal supports
basic human needs (Treasury Department Interview 2010). The no vote position of the
U.S. is part of a broader strategy of economic sanctions the U.S. has levied on China.
These sanctions include limits on U.S. bilateral foreign assistance, bans on exports of
defense related articles and services including munitions and dual use technology, and a
ban on Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs. However, many of these
restrictions can be waived or modified by the President (Rennack 2005). These
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prohibitions were instituted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre and have
been maintained to varying degrees since.

Tiananmen Square and Aftermath
After the Cold War economic matters became more prominent in U.S. foreign
policy while security factors were somewhat diminished. This trend was the case in U.S.
foreign policy towards China as well, allowing Congress and concerned interest groups to
gain more opportunities to shape U.S. policy towards China. Congress tends to play a
bigger role in foreign economic matters (trade policy etc.) as opposed to strictly security
matters, which are mostly the purview of the President. In addition the continual
reauthorization of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status provided an avenue for Congress
(and interest groups through them) to influence policy toward China (Lampton 2001). In
general, U.S. foreign policy is often driven by the struggle of members of Congress who
are subject to various particular pressures that often puts them at odds with the
administration (regardless of partisanship of the President), and the President who have
generally tried to maintain a non-antagonistic relationship with China (Garrison 2005).
The decision by the U.S. to use its position in the MDBs to induce better human
rights practices in China began in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989. In the spring and early summer of 1989 the Chinese pro-Democracy movement
was reaching its peak with pro-Democracy protestors congregating in Tiananmen Square
for months. Finally, on June 3rd and 4th the People’s Liberation Army was sent into the
square to disperse the protestors and ended up killing hundreds and perhaps thousands of
protestors (Drury and Li 2006).
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The Bush administration’s policy towards China was one of continual
engagement. The administration was reluctant to pursue sanctions that would disrupt the
relationship they were developing. However, in the immediate aftermath of the events at
Tiananmen President Bush did suspend arm sales and an exchange of military
delegations, but rejected calls for economic sanctions. A coalition of right-wing antiCommunists and human rights liberals in Congress were unsatisfied with President
Bush’s response and advocated for strong economic sanctions to go along with the
suspension of arms sales (Skidmore and Gates 1997). President Bush resisted the call
from members of Congress for imposing economic sanctions by stating that would be an
“emotional response” to the crackdown (Weinraub 1989).
By June 20th Secretary Baker stated that the U.S. was suspending diplomatic
contact with China and called on the World Bank to suspend new lending to China. In
addition, the administration announced that it would vote against proposals for China in
the World Bank and AsDB. The House of Representatives passed an amendment to the
Foreign Aid Bill of that year 418-0, which included a ban on trade and development
assistance, suspension of OPIC insurance, and an end to cooperation on nuclear energy
development. The Senate version of the legislation contained a provision allowing the
President to waive the sanctions against China if it made progress on human rights and if
the waiver was in the “national interest.” This language was different from the House
version, which stated the President could waive the restrictions only if they were in the
“national security interest” of the U.S. The Senate version won out allowing the
President more flexibility in waiving the restrictions (Skidmore and Gates 1997).
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In addition to the automatic no vote by the U.S. in the MDBs the U.S. actively
worked to deny loans to China in the MDBs. In fact there was an agreement among the
G7 countries in 1990 that they would approve loans to China only if they supported basic
human needs. In 1990 the World Bank did not make any loans to China except for six,
all of which qualified as meeting basic human needs. G7 opposition to MDB loans to
China quickly dissipated, however, as additional exceptions were introduced which
would allow support for MDB loans to China. The additional criteria included loans that
would facilitate economic reform and loans for projects that would benefit the
environment. With these extra criteria, along with the basic human needs criteria, it
became easier for the rest of the G7 countries to support lending to China (Sanford 1997).
The U.S. position towards China in the MDBs has been maintained since 1990 even as
the rest of the G7 quickly abandoned their opposition. Since the breakdown among G7
countries on voting against loans to China the U.S. was not able to deny a loan to China,
even though they continued to vote against them, until roughly ten years later.

Qinghai Loan
The next major confrontation the U.S. had concerning China in the MDBs was in
1999 with the proposed resettlement of tens of thousands of Tibetans. The World Bank
originally approved a large anti-poverty proposal for China, which contained a section
allocating $40 million that would require the resettlement of 58,000 farmers in Qinghai
province, which is located next to Tibet. The resettlement portion of the proposal drew
criticism from the U.S., especially members of Congress, and others claiming that part of
the purpose of the resettlement by the Chinese government was to dilute Tibetan culture
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by reducing the number of ethnic Tibetans in the region. There were also objections to
the proposal based on concerns about its environmental impact. The Executive Board of
the World Bank approved the proposal over objections from the U.S., which voted no,
and Germany along with abstentions from four other Executive Directors. No funds were
distributed for the proposal until the World Bank Inspection Panel reviewed it (Blustein
1999).
The World Bank Inspection Panel was set up by the Executive Board in 1993 to
serve as a forum for those who feel they may be adversely affected by World Bank
projects to bring their objections to decision makers within the World Bank. The
Inspection Panel was meant to give non-state actors the ability to voice concerns they had
regarding the social and environmental impact World Bank projects may have. The
Inspection Panel is also tasked with ensuring that the World Bank is following its own
procedures and policies. These policies are meant to ensure that World Bank projects
provide social and environmental benefits not social and environmental harm (Roos
2001). The Inspection Panel’s conclusion was that the World Bank had violated some of
its guidelines in approving the project. Specifically, the Inspection Panel review
concluded that the World Bank had violated its own procedures regarding environmental
assessment, protecting indigenous peoples, preventing involuntary resettlement, pest
management, and disclosure of information (Roos 2001).
With this information the U.S. and a coalition of other countries including Japan,
Britain, and Germany managed to require additional review of the project before funds
would be distributed to resettle the ethnic Tibetan farmers. This resulted in effectively
killing the project because China decided to withdraw the proposal from consideration,
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stating that they would pay for the resettlement on their own (Kahn 2000). The Chinese
representative to the World Bank stated that, “The World Bank has lost a good
opportunity to assist some of the poorest people in China.” (quoted in Moritsugu 2000)
In addition the Chinese representative to the World Bank stated that China had to
withdraw the proposal because of political pressure from the U.S. Referring to the
demand by the U.S. and others for further review of the proposal the Chinese delegate
noted that, “compliance policies have been interpreted by some to an extreme and used
for political purposes.” (quoted in Kahn 2000) There was also significant activist
pressure on the World Bank and sympathetic Executive Directors, including the USED,
to stop the proposal from going through. Activists associated with the International
Campaign for Tibet and other activist groups had been protesting outside the World Bank
headquarters in Washington D.C. for days (Moritsugu 2000).
Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 the U.S. has consistently voted
against loans to China in the MDBs and only supported those loans that directly benefited
basic human needs. Since the U.S. does not have veto power in the Executive Boards of
the MDBs it cannot stop loans going to China by itself. However in a couple of
instances, particularly in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre and with the
withdrawal of the proposal by China of the Qinghai loan, the U.S. has been able to garner
enough support on the Executive Board to actually stop lending to China in the MDBs.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The Place of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy
The main findings of this dissertation suggest that human rights occupy an
important but limited role in U.S. foreign policy. Strategic interests, primarily supporting
allies with military aid, are the primary determinant of positive U.S. votes in the MDBs;
however, a country’s support for political rights are also a significant determinant of
positive U.S. votes. Specifically if the country in question is one of the worst violators of
political rights the likelihood of U.S. support in the MDBs declines considerably. More
interesting results are when those two factors are dealt with together. Specifically, how
does the U.S. vote towards countries that have a poor record on protecting political rights
but also receive military aid? In this context countries that receive U.S. military aid are
more likely to garner U.S. support in terms of positive votes in the MDBs. However,
those countries still receive less support overall from the U.S. than countries that protect
political rights Together these two findings illustrate the fact that normative and
strategic goals both animate U.S. foreign policy. More broadly, the tension between
realism and liberalism is seen in the findings of why the U.S. votes in favor or against
proposals in the MDBs.
Along with the strategic and normative goals of helping allies and promoting
human rights, the level of development of recipient countries also determined U.S. yes
votes. The U.S. tended to support proposals going to countries with a lower level of
development (as measured by GDP per capita) than countries with a higher level of
development. Of course all countries that are eligible for MDB loans are middle income
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or low-income countries so U.S. lack of support for countries with a higher level of
economic development needs to be put into that context. Support for countries on the
lower end of the development spectrum by the U.S. in some measure indicates that the
U.S. is in line with the missions of the MDBs. The main purpose of the MDBs is to
provide development loans at below market rates for countries that have difficultly
securing financing from the private sector. Therefore those countries with low levels of
per capita GDP are ideal targets for MDB support, which the U.S. appears to support.
When looking at the issues of level of development and human rights together the
question becomes does the U.S. still support loans to low GDP per capita countries even
if they have a poor human rights record? The results in this dissertation point out that for
countries that were at lower levels of development and had a poor record on protecting
political rights the U.S. voted in favor of those countries at a lower rate then countries at
a comparative level of development but with a positive record on protecting human
rights. However, the U.S. still supported those countries more than it did their
counterparts who also had poor records on protecting political rights but were at higher
levels of development.
Recipient country respect for political rights was a significant factor but respect
for rights of personal integrity was not significant. In other words, countries that abused
the political rights of their citizens were less likely to receive affirmative votes from the
U.S. than those that respected those rights, but countries that abused the rights of personal
integrity of their citizens faced no such sanction. Previous studies have also found a
similar pattern (Lebovic and Voeten 2009). A potential explanation for this distinction
between support for countries that respect political rights and not for countries that
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respect rights of personal integrity is that support for political rights is often intertwined
with the practice of democracy. Democracy promotion is an important component of
U.S. foreign policy overall and of the Bush administration in particular, which was
creating policy for the majority of the time period under investigation in this study.
Also a somewhat surprising finding in this dissertation is the minor influence that
UN voting similarity had on U.S. votes in the MDBs. Recent research has suggested that
voting similarity with the U.S. in the UN is an important determinant of the amount of
money that is actually distributed for World Bank loans (Kilby 2010). The inference here
is that UN voting similarity is a proxy for the informal influence the U.S. exerts in the
World Bank. More specifically, the idea is that countries with a close UN voting
similarity would receive more money for World Bank projects. The results from this
dissertation indicate that countries with a close UN voting similarity with the U.S. were
slightly less likely to receive a yes vote from the U.S. The incongruity between these two
results might indicate that the U.S. exercises formal and informal influence in the MDBs
in different ways. The idea is that formally (through voting) the U.S. does not want to
appear biased towards political allies but informally (through influencing the amount of
money that is distributed to projects) the U.S. tries to favor its political allies.
Finally, in terms of the interaction between strategic interests and norms in
determining U.S. votes in the MDBs, promoting domestic economic prosperity
(measured by level of trade between the U.S. and recipient countries) was not significant
in the full model. On first glance it seems that this was not a priority for the U.S. in
determining votes in the MDBs but when one looks at the results for the models without
votes for China, level of trade becomes significant. What this shows is two things; first
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since China is the second largest trading partner of the U.S. it skewed the sample so when
it was removed level of trade became significant. Second, China had a large volume of
proposals in the MDBs (4th most) and the U.S. voted no on the vast majority of them.
Therefore without votes for Chinese proposals in the model level of trade is significant.
This indicates that the U.S. is more supportive of loans going to countries in which it has
a higher volume of trade then to countries with which it has a lower volume of trade.
In general, human rights and strategic interests both play a role in determining
U.S. votes in the MDBs with strategic interests (such as supporting allies with military
aid) somewhat more prominent that human rights in deciding how the U.S. will vote.
Also the level of development of the recipient country plays an important role in
determining how the U.S. will vote.
With reference to specific human rights policies the U.S. pursues in the MDBs
two trends stand out. First, as referenced above, a large percentage of U.S. no votes for
human rights reasons were targeted at China. As the case study on U.S. foreign policy
towards China in the MDBs showed, the U.S. has targeted China for its human rights
abuses going back to the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989. This trend has continued as
the U.S. mainly references section 701 of the IFI Act (general human rights code) as
justification for voting no on proposals from China for human rights reasons. The
automatic no vote for proposals from China is just one of a variety of economic sanctions
the U.S. maintains on China, from restrictions on bilateral economic assistance to bans on
the sale of military and dual use technology to bans on Overseas Private investment
Corporation programs, among others (Rennack 2005). There is leeway in the application
of these sanctions however as the President has the ability to modify or waive the
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restrictions. Regarding the prohibition on supporting proposals for China in the MDBs
the U.S. can, and does, support proposals that benefit basic human needs. So in effect the
U.S. does end up lending its support to a fair amount of proposals for China in the MDBs
but only if those proposals directly benefit people in need.
The other specific human rights trend that is made clear when analyzing U.S.
voting patterns in the MDBs is votes against countries for failing to apprehend war
criminals. Serbia, and to a lesser extent Bosnia, was the primary target of these no votes.
As with China, the number of codes applied to Serbia is reflective of the number of loan
proposals that they bring before the Executive Boards but nevertheless the signal the US
is sending is that they expect Serbia (and others) to comply with the ICTY by bringing
suspected war criminals to justice. Since 2001 Congress has condition aid to Serbia on
three factors: cooperation with the ICTY, ending support for Bosnian Serb institutions,
and protecting minority rights and the rule of law. In the spring of each year the
Secretary of State must certify if Serbia has met these requirements for the fiscal year,
which means Serbian cooperation with the ICTY tends to increase as the certification
deadline approaches. For example, Slobodan Milosevic was arrested on April 1, 2001
and was certified the next day by Secretary of State Powell (Woehrel 2008).
In summary, the general findings of this dissertation are in line with findings from
studies focusing on the post-Cold War distribution of bilateral aid. Those studies found
that strategic goals, such as supporting allies with military aid, and normative goals, such
as promoting political rights, are both foreign policy goals the U.S. pursues with bilateral
aid. Those are also policies the U.S. pursues in the MDBs. On top of that the U.S. also
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aligns itself with the mission of the MDBs by supporting proposals for the poorer
countries in the MDBs.
In broader terms, what emerged from this dissertation is a notion that there are
multiple factors that influence U.S. foreign policy and human rights are and important but
limited one. This dissertation fits with previous works on human rights and U.S. foreign
policy in that it shows that human rights have a variable role in U.S. foreign policy. Or in
other words, human rights in U.S. foreign policy are context specific. What was seen in
this dissertation is that human rights, particularly political rights, influence U.S. foreign
policy but they have to been situated into the broader context of strategic interests. This
can also be taken as evidence that strategic interests and normative values are not
altogether separate issues and are instead perhaps re-enforcing and not competing.

Ares for Further Research
As was stated in chapter two, the study of human rights and U.S. foreign policy in
the MDBs was quite prominent in the 1980s but since then there has not been any
sustained treatment of the subject. This dissertation represents an update of that literature
as well as an extension of the literature on U.S. bilateral aid and human rights. With that
being said there are still plenty of areas for further research. Specifically, there are four
areas in particular that the present study points towards for further research.
The first area for further research is to expand on the current model used in this
dissertation. This can primarily be done by including additional variables that address
U.S. strategic interests and normative values. For example, to further capture the
dimension of strategic interests that includes promoting the domestic economy one could
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include a measure of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI). The assumption would be that
the more U.S. FDI going to a recipient country the more likely the U.S. would vote in
favor of proposals to that country since that country is a source for U.S. investment,
indicating its importance for U.S. economic performance. Another useful addition to the
model would be the inclusion of a control variable for population. Population is often
included as a control variable in studies of U.S. bilateral aid as the assumption is that
larger countries require greater volume of aid. Similar logic could also apply to votes in
the MDBs as larger countries tend to have more proposals than smaller countries.
The second area for further research is moving beyond an analysis of formal votes
in the MDBs to examine informal processes the U.S. may use to promote human rights or
other foreign policy goals. As was also mentioned in chapter two there has been previous
research indicating that the U.S. exercises a lot of informal influence in the MDBs (Babe
2009; McKeown 2009; Wade 2002; Woods 2003, 2000;). However, this research does
not focus on whether or not the U.S. uses its informal influence to promote human rights
in the MDBs (at least not primarily).

Pivoting off of the present study, however, one

could ask does the U.S. use its informal influence to promote human rights in the MDBs
and if so how? One of the weaknesses of the present study is by relying on formal votes
as an indicator for how the U.S. promotes human rights it does not account for those
proposals that fail to make it before the Executive Boards for a vote. It is in this area
where the U.S. may exert informal influence in shaping and preventing proposals from
being developed. This would provide a more comprehensive view of how human rights
fit into U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs.
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The third area for further research would be to examine whether the amount of
money distributed for MDB loans is greater for loans the U.S. supported in contrast to
loans that passed the Executive Board but were not supported by the U.S. Kilby (2010)
argues that close U.N. voting similarity with the U.S. correlates with more money
distributed for loans for those countries. Kilby (2010) however does not see how the
amount of funds distributed correlates with U.S. votes. This would be another means of
testing U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs and one could also examine how the human
rights record of recipient states influence both U.S. votes but also the amount of money
distributed.
A fourth area of potential research is a comparison of U.S with votes of other
countries in the MDBs. A comparative approach would provide further context for U.S.
votes in seeing whether the U.S. supports or opposes proposals at different rates then
other countries. Another approach would be to see if other countries aside from the U.S.
take the human rights record of the recipient country into account when deciding whether
to vote on the proposal or not. One problem in this area, however, is the lack of available
voting data for other countries to compare with the U.S. The World Bank has recently
started to release the minutes of the Executive Board meetings to the public but there is
often times little detail on voting procedures contained within (McIntosh 2009). The
other MDBs have also been less than forthcoming with voting information from their
Executive Board meetings. Despite these limitations there is still ample room for further
research in the area of human rights and U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs.
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Normative Considerations
One final issue to consider is what place human rights should occupy in U.S.
foreign policy in the MDBs. The purpose of this dissertation has been empirical, to
discern the actual place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs. There are
however normative implications that should be considered as well. This section will not
attempt a systematic consideration of all normative issues involved but only briefly touch
on the issue. Specifically, this section will only briefly consider what obligations the
U.S. has to promote human rights in the MDBs.
The purpose of human rights (or what human rights do) is to protect human
agency against abuse and oppression (Ignatieff 2001). Rights in general give rise to duties
that seek the realization or fulfillment of those rights. For example, human rights have
traditionally been thought to create a vertical duty for states to promote and protect the
rights of individuals within their territory (Knox 2008). That states have a duty to protect
the human rights of their own citizens is not however the main issue when considering
U.S. foreign policy in the MDBs. In this instance the question become what obligations
does the U.S. have to promote and protect the human rights of people in other countries?
Specifically, what obligations does the U.S. have to promote human rights through the
distribution of MDB development projects?
There are a variety of ethical theories, which posit obligations for states to adhere
to in the protection and promotion of human rights outside their boarders, the most
common of which is probably cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism takes the individual as
the starting point for moral consideration and therefore questions the notion that state
boundaries are the boundaries of moral obligation (Cochran 1999). Cosmopolitanism

149
constitutes a “concern for the whole” or a level of identity above national citizenship,
which implies that individuals or institutions have duties towards others outside of your
immediate community (Anderson-Gold 2001). This idea has perhaps most forcefully
been developed in the work of Thomas Pogge, who writes of the duties implicit in the
concept of human rights. In his writing on global poverty Pogge (2002) argues that
citizens of the world’s wealthiest nations, as participants in the global economic order,
share an institutional background, which creates a duty to help the world’s poor who
suffer at the hands of the current economic order. Pogge claims, “that the citizens and
governments of the wealthy societies, by imposing the present global economic order,
significantly contribute to the persistence of severe poverty and thus share institutional
moral responsibility for it.” (2002: 140) Pogge claims that governments and individuals
do have duties beyond their borders to promote human rights (although his specific claim
is in reducing poverty). The one drawback of Pogge’s argument as a basis for deriving
duties is a lack of specification about those duties.
A perhaps more fruitful theory to determine duties to promote human rights
across borders is Amartya Sen’s theory of human rights (2004). Sen conceptualizes
human rights as primarily ethical demands. From Sen’s perspective the importance of
human rights derives from the freedoms that form the substance of those rights, meaning
“the human right of not being tortured springs from the importance of freedom from
torture for all.” (2004: 321) For a freedom to be numbered as a human rights it has to
meet the criteria of (1) importance, meaning the freedom has to be of such importance
that society should focus on it, and (2) “social influencability”, meaning that it can be
guaranteed through social help (Sen 2004: 329-330).
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Because of their basis in human freedom, human rights generate reasons for
acting for those who are positioned to promote or keep safe those freedoms. More
specifically those reasons for acting can create both perfect and imperfect obligations.
Perfect obligations create specific acts that particular individuals or actors have to
perform to ensure the protection of a right, while imperfect obligations go beyond the
specifics of perfect obligations. Imperfect obligations according to Sen, “involve the
demand that serious consideration be given by anyone in a position to provide reasonable
help to the person whose human right is threatened.” (2004: 341)
For example, a perfect obligation would be to not torture. In this case the specific
action (or non-action) delineated by the duty is to refrain from the act of torture. The
specific actions required by an imperfect obligation in this context are more complicated.
In this instance the actions required are dependent on the position of the individual
involved. With regards to the torture scenario, if one guard was torturing a prisoner
while another guard was standing by observing, one could claim, using the notion of
imperfect obligations, the second guard is required to do what is reasonably expected to
stop the first guard from torturing the prisoner. This could include a variety of actions
including physically stopping the first guard from torturing the prisoner to alerting a
supervisor It is important to point out that perfect and imperfect obligations only differ
in their content (i.e. what they require an individual or institution to do) not in their
connection to specific rights (Sen 2004). Essentially, the notion of perfect and imperfect
obligations create a structured ethic that requires different actions from individuals and
institutions depending on their distance or proximity to the right in question.
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In the case of U.S. votes in the MDBs then how might the structured ethic of
perfect and imperfect obligations guide U.S. voting policy with regards to human rights?
In terms of perfect obligations the U.S. has an obligation to refrain from direct abuses of
human rights. This is not really the issue with votes in the MDBs, which really involves
potential indirect support for human rights violations. If the U.S. supports loans that go
to rights abusing regimes that may be considered indirect support for human rights
violations. Conversely, however, the U.S. can also put itself in the position of indirectly
supporting human rights violations by voting against projects because the government
receiving them is rights repressive but the money distributed might be beneficial to the
population regardless.
In practical terms then the basic human needs approach seems to be the best way
for the U.S. to maintain its imperfect obligations towards human rights in the MDBs. As
was mentioned in chapter four many of the legislative mandates that require the U.S. to
oppose proposals for countries that violate human rights also contain a clause that allows
for exceptions if the assistance meets basic human needs. This approach seems to thread
the needle between punishing rights abusing states by voting no on projects that do not
satisfy basic human needs but also refrains from punishing vulnerable populations by
supporting proposals that directly benefit them. In conclusion, it appears that the U.S. is
responding to its imperfect obligations towards human rights in the MDBs in an
acceptable way. This is contingent however, on how the basic human needs exceptions
are utilized in that they are not used as a smokescreen to still support loans for rights
abusing states but with the veneer of helping needy people.
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APPENDIX
List of Interviews
1. Phone Interview with staff member of Office of Debt and Development Policy,
International Affairs, Department of the Treasury, December 28th 2010
2. Interview with staff members of Office of Development Finance, Bureau of Economic,
Energy, and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State. January 10th, 2011,
Washington D.C.
3. Interview with former staff member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S.
Senate. January 10th, 2011. Washington D.C.
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List of MDB Reason Codes
Reason Code
1.

Description
Economic and policy considerations

2.

Surplus commodities as defined under P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 514.

3.

Communist dictatorships, as governed by P.L. 98-181, Sec. 804.

4.

Surplus mineral production, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006,
Sec. 514.
Expropriation, as governed by P.L. 103-236, Sec. 527. The assistance does not support
basic human needs.
Narcotics, as governed by P.L. 87-195, Sec. 490(a)(2) and 490A(a)(2), as amended by
the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, by the International Narcotics Control Act
of 1992, and by P.L. 103-447, Sec. 101 and further amended in P.L. 104-66, Sec. 1112
(d).
Human rights, as governed by P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701, and amended by P.L. 101-240
Sec. 541(c), and P.L. 102-511, Sec. 1008. The assistance supports basic human needs.
Human rights, as governed by P.L. 95-118, Sec. 701, and amended by P.L. 101-240,
Sec. 541(c), and P.L. 102-511, Sec. 1008. The assistance does not support basic
human needs.
Environmental reporting, as governed by P.L. 101-240, Sec. 521, as amended by P.L.
105-118, Sec. 560(b)(3) and by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations
2005, Sec. 793.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

International terrorism, as governed by P.L. 104-132, Sec. 327.

11.

Chemical and biological weapons production, as governed by Executive Order 12735.

12.

Harboring indictees for war crimes, as governed by P.L. 107-115, Sec. 581(b-d).

13.

16.

Policy towards Burma (human rights/democratic government), as governed by P.L.
104-208, Sec. 570(a)(2).
Government of Cambodia, as governed by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005,
Sec. 554(a). The assistance does not support basic human needs.
Government of Cambodia, as governed by P.L. 108-447, Foreign Operations 2005,
Sec. 554(a). The assistance supports basic human needs
Other environmental reporting (e.g., Treasury policy votes not specified in #9 above).

17.

Nuclear material, as governed by P.L. 103-236, Sec. 823.

18.

Palm oil, sugar, and citrus, as governed by P.L. 95-118, Sec. 901(a).

19.

Serbia or Montenegro, as governed by P.L. 103-160, Defense Authorization, Sec.
1511(c) and P.L. 104-208, Sec. 540.
Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign
Operations 2006, Sec. 561(a)(1). Exceptions or waiver authority not
applied.

14.
15.

20.

21.

Worker rights, trade distortion, surplus capacity, as governed by P.L. 100-202, Sec.
406(1).
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List of MDB Reason Codes Continued
22.

Female genital mutilation, as governed by P.L. 104-208, Sec. 579.

23.

Sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices, as governed by P.L. 103-236,
Sec. 826(a) as amended by Sec. 102(b)(2)(E).
The assistance supports basic human needs.
Sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices, as governed by P.L. 103-236,
Sec. 826(a) as amended by Sec. 102(b)(2)(E).
The assistance does not support basic human needs.
Waiver of sanctions for transfer or use of nuclear explosive devices with respect to India
and Pakistan, as governed by P.L. 106-79, Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2000, Title IX, Sec. 9001(a).
Expropriation, as governed by P.L. 103-236. Sec. 527. The assistance supports basic

24.
25.
26.

human needs.
27.

IMF bailouts of banks, as governed by P.L. 98-181, Sec. 807.

28.

30.

Religious persecution, as governed by P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec. 402, 405(12) and
422. The assistance supports basic human needs.
Religious persecution, as governed by P.L. 105-292, Title V, Sec. 402, 405(12) and
422. The assistance does not support basic human needs.
Serbia-Montenegro, as governed by P.L. 105-277, Sec. 514(b).

31.

Cuba, as governed by P.L. 104-114, Sec. 104.

32.

Sanctions on use of chemical or biological weapons, as governed by P.L. 102-182, Sec.
307.
Chemical weapons sanctions on disclosure of confidential business information, as
governed by P.L. 105-277, Division I, Sec. 103(e)(2)(A), Sec.
103(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Sec. 103(e)(3)(B)(v).
IMF Korea, as governed by P.L. 105-277, Sec. 602(a), (1998).

29.

33.
34.
35.

Transparency of budgets: audit of military expenditures, as governed by P.L. 104-208,
Sec. 576 as amended by P.L. 105-118, Sec. 572.
The assistance supports basic human needs.

36.

Transparency of budgets: audit of military expenditures, as governed by P.L. 104-208,
Sec. 576 as amended by P.L. 105-118, Sec. 572.
The assistance does not support basic human needs.

37.

Serbia, as governed by P.L. 106-113, Sec. 599(b)(1), (1999).

38.

Serbia, as governed by P.L. 106-429, Sec. 594(b), (2000).

39.

User fees, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 562.

40.

Trafficking in persons, as governed by P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110. The assistance
supports one or more specified exceptions.
Trafficking in persons, as governed by P.L. 106-386, Sec. 110. The assistance does
not qualify under any specified exception.
IMF programs and debt levels, as governed by P.L. 98-181, Sec. 806.

41.
42.
43.

Failing to apprehend war criminal indictees, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign
Operations 2006, Sec. 561(a)(1). Exceptions or waiver authority applies.
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44.
45.

USA PATRIOT Act on deterring international terrorism, as governed by P.L. 107-56,
Sec. 360.
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, P.L. 107-99.

46.

Zimbabwe, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 572.

47.

52.

Serbia, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 (Foreign Operations 2006). If Serbia
is not certified.
Serbia, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Sec. 563 (Foreign Operations 2006). If Serbia
is certified.
India IBRD Water and Sewage, as governed by P.L. 107-115, Foreign Operations
FY2002, Title IV.
Tibet, as governed by P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003, Sec
616(b).
East Timor, as governed by P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003,
Sec. 633.
Sudan, as governed by P.L. 107-245, Sudan Peace Act section 6(b)(2) (2002).

53.

Burma, as governed by Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, P.L. 108-61.

54.

Burma, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 526(a).

55.

Iraq, as governed by P.L. 108-11, Sec. 1503, as amended by P.L. 108-106, Sec. 2204.

56.

Tibet, as governed by P.L. 109-102, Foreign Operations 2006, Sec. 575(a).

57.

Commodities or minerals in surplus on world markets, as governed by P.L. 99-472 of the
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986.
Copper exports, mines and mining, as governed by P.L. 99-88, Sec. 501.

48.
49.
50.
51.

58.
59.
60.

Mining, smelting and refining, as governed by P.L. 99-88, Sec. 502, as amended by P.L.
102-285.
Commodities, products, or minerals for export, as governed by P.L. 100-202, Foreign
Operations, FY1987, Title XIV, Sec. 1403(b) of the IFI Act, as amended
by P.L. 106-36, Title I, Sec. 1002.

61.

Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, 2004, as governed by P.L. 108-497.

62.

Project could have significant environmental impacts, but such impacts have been
mitigated Development outcomes expected to be broadly positive.

63.

Sri Lanka, as governed by P.L. 111-117, Division F, Sec.7089. The assistance
supports basic human needs.
Sri Lanka, as governed by P.L. 111-117, Division F, Sec.7089. The assistance does
not support basic human needs.

64.
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Code
(7) General HR
(Human Needs)
(8) General HR
(12) War Crimes
(Harboring)
(13) Policy Towards
Burma (Human
Rights/Democratic
Governance)
(14) Cambodia
(15) Cambodia
(Human Needs)
(20) War Crimes
(failure to
apprehend)
(21) Worker Rights
(22) FGM
(28) Religious
Persecution (Human
Needs)
(29) Religious
Persecution
(40) Trafficking
(Exemption)
(41) Trafficking
(43) War Crimes
(Failure to
ApprehendExemption)
(45) Zimbabwe
(Democracy and
Econ Recovery Act)
(46) Zimbabwe
(47) Serbia
(48) Serbia
(certified)
(52) Sudan (Sudan
Peace Act
(53) Burma
(freedom and dem
act)
(63) Sri Lanka
(Human Needs)
(64) Sri Lanka
Total

Bosnia

Bulgaria

Burundi

Cambodia

China

Croatia

E Guinea

Iran

0
0

0
0

0
2

0
0

102
171

0
0

0
2

1
3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
9

1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

27

4

0

0

0

1

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0
0
34

0
0
4

0
0
2

0
0
16

0
0
275

0
0
1

0
0
2

0
0
4
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Code
(7) General HR
(Human Needs)
(8) General HR
(12) War Crimes
(Harboring)
(13) Policy Towards
Burma (Human
Rights/Democratic
Governance)
(14) Cambodia
(15) Cambodia
(Human Needs)
(20) War Crimes
(failure to
apprehend)
(21) Worker Rights
(22) FGM
(28) Religious
Persecution (Human
Needs)
(29) Religious
Persecution
(40) Trafficking
(Exemption)
(41) Trafficking
(43) War Crimes
(Failure to
ApprehendExemption)
(45) Zimbabwe
(Democracy and
Econ Recovery Act)
(46) Zimbabwe
(47) Serbia
(48) Serbia
(certified)
(52) Sudan (Sudan
Peace Act
(53) Burma
(freedom and dem
act)
(63) Sri Lanka
(Human Needs)
(64) Sri Lanka
Total

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Lebanon

Libya

Moldova

0
2

1
0

0
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

5
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

20

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
1

0
1

0
0

0
4

0
1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

0
0
2

0
0
1

0
0
2

0
0
1

0
0
2

0
0
14

0
0
29

0

Myanmar

Regional
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Code
(7) General HR
(Human Needs)
(8) General HR
(12) War
Crimes
(Harboring)
(13) Policy
Towards Burma
(Human
Rights/Democra
tic Governance)
(14) Cambodia
(15) Cambodia
(Human Needs)
(20) War
Crimes (failure
to apprehend)
(21) Worker
Rights
(22) FGM
(28) Religious
Persecution
(Human Needs)
(29) Religious
Persecution
(40) Trafficking
(Exemption)
(41) Trafficking
(43) War
Crimes (Failure
to ApprehendExemption)
(45) Zimbabwe
(Democracy and
Econ Recovery
Act)
(46) Zimbabwe
(47) Serbia
(48) Serbia
(certified)
(52) Sudan
(Sudan Peace
Act
(53) Burma
(freedom and
dem act)
(63) Sri Lanka
(Human Needs)
(64) Sri Lanka
Total

Romania

Russia

Serbia

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0

Sri
Lanka

Sudan

Uganda

0
0

Zimbabwe

0
0

2
5

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

83

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
3

0
1

1
8

0
1

0

0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
12

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0
2

0
0
2

0
0
101

3
1
4

0
0
25

0
0
1

0
0
9

0
0
1

0

0
0

Venezuela

0

0

0
0
0

0

0

0
0
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Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canary Island
Cape Verde
Central African Repub
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, DR
Congo, Rep
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Cote d`Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Djibouti
Dominica

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

17
7
0
2
0
26
11
1
16
1
0
19
0
5
2
11
1
20
8
2
46
0
12
15
14
12
6
0
4
1
7
16
43
22
2
11
8
0
4
5
9
3
5
1

15
6
2
9
1
27
8
0
21
4
0
17
4
10
3
5
3
23
16
3
53
2
21
10
3
15
5
0
2
2
8
17
62
34
0
14
1
2
13
3
10
2
4
2

21
9
6
2
0
37
16
0
19
2
1
14
3
4
5
10
6
15
14
2
56
0
8
14
6
9
8
0
4
2
3
17
60
41
1
2
2
1
14
3
12
0
1
1

14
11
0
4
0
38
24
0
22
2
0
19
1
12
3
4
6
23
18
3
65
2
20
9
4
15
2
0
5
5
4
26
59
32
0
8
3
0
11
2
19
2
5
2

12
13
2
5
0
41
12
0
23
1
0
25
4
8
3
11
3
17
15
1
78
2
16
15
10
20
8
0
4
5
2
26
44
38
2
10
4
1
14
10
14
2
6
1

18
7
4
3
1
26
20
0
15
0
0
16
4
8
6
4
2
17
11
7
71
0
16
8
12
14
9
1
2
11
6
15
47
35
5
8
6
2
6
8
15
0
2
0

97
53
14
25
2
195
91
1
116
10
1
110
16
47
22
45
21
115
82
18
369
6
93
71
49
85
38
1
21
26
30
117
315
202
10
53
24
6
62
31
79
9
23
7
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Dominican Republic
Dubai
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
FYR Macedonia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Grenada
Grenadines
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea
Kosovo
Kyrgyz Rep
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Madagascar
Malawi

10
0
16
9
12
1
4
1
20
8
0
2
4
7
14
3
0
13
4
7
10
3
17
0
4
40
28
5
1
3
1
12
16
0
1
0
14
7
2
1
3
3
0
2
13
2

15
1
12
10
27
2
1
3
4
6
2
5
3
18
13
3
0
18
5
1
2
16
24
0
3
37
42
3
3
6
4
17
10
0
0
4
14
19
3
1
4
1
0
4
13
9

15
0
27
18
13
0
2
2
10
6
3
2
4
20
10
0
1
21
12
4
14
15
16
1
3
68
32
0
2
6
3
17
17
2
0
3
8
15
2
0
3
2
1
5
13
6

15
0
27
20
9
0
1
2
9
13
0
3
2
19
24
3
0
15
4
1
6
7
18
0
4
67
23
0
1
6
5
29
11
0
0
8
18
10
4
9
5
9
1
4
16
5

10
0
14
13
10
4
3
2
14
7
0
1
5
17
16
3
0
23
6
8
5
14
29
0
1
56
22
0
1
12
8
22
7
0
0
0
14
15
1
2
2
11
0
3
10
5

20
0
7
18
12
1
1
2
10
7
3
4
4
18
13
1
0
16
1
7
3
23
12
0
10
52
26
0
2
15
6
26
17
1
0
3
25
11
4
3
5
9
1
4
3
7

85
1
103
88
83
8
12
12
67
47
8
17
22
99
90
13
1
106
32
28
40
78
116
1
25
320
173
8
10
48
27
123
78
3
1
18
93
77
16
16
22
35
3
22
68
34
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Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Regional
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Serbia - Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia

0
1
14
0
7
2
24
2
8
10
0
5
6
0
3
0
13
18
6
15
1
29
0
5
1
3
24
17
17
60
32
68
14
2
4
1
12
5
25
1
7
0
1
1
0
0

2
5
10
0
3
4
47
0
13
6
0
8
9
6
4
0
3
15
7
21
3
45
0
6
2
23
19
18
13
53
36
92
6
2
0
2
13
7
18
4
8
0
4
1
0
1

2
4
11
2
8
2
41
1
12
10
1
13
11
1
1
1
11
21
9
19
1
34
1
14
5
13
42
15
10
81
31
119
8
2
1
2
14
16
12
2
2
1
1
1
3
0

4
2
6
0
2
2
41
1
14
20
12
9
17
1
2
0
8
17
6
20
1
45
0
21
8
18
40
19
4
51
26
94
4
6
0
1
3
22
0
0
3
2
3
3
2
0

2
5
10
0
8
3
42
0
17
17
6
8
8
2
1
0
8
22
12
16
0
19
0
22
2
17
25
17
5
63
16
63
12
2
2
1
13
12
0
2
7
1
1
1
3
0

1
3
12
1
2
7
29
1
13
12
7
8
7
0
1
1
18
20
7
24
0
25
1
12
8
13
39
15
15
77
20
69
15
1
1
1
15
22
0
3
9
0
3
0
5
0

11
20
63
3
30
20
224
5
77
75
26
51
58
10
12
2
61
113
47
115
6
197
2
80
26
87
189
101
64
385
161
505
59
15
8
8
70
84
55
12
36
4
13
7
13
1
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South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & Gren
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
USA
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total

9
14
0
6
4
6
5
0
0
15
25
2
1
4
0
1
6
16
3
1
0
16
19
0
8
12
0
4
17
4
1
11
0

8
16
1
3
1
2
1
4
0
14
9
9
2
1
1
2
8
20
2
0
0
11
36
0
15
9
0
6
31
2
3
6
4

7
6
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
14
18
4
2
4
1
4
5
18
1
1
1
11
42
2
16
9
1
3
21
6
7
7
2

15
13
1
3
1
1
6
0
0
11
20
2
7
1
0
2
4
19
4
0
0
14
47
0
18
10
0
3
25
2
7
9
0

3
8
0
3
0
3
2
2
1
12
10
4
1
9
2
2
8
13
2
1
0
14
41
0
18
10
0
1
28
11
8
7
0

5
14
0
0
1
3
2
0
1
18
12
3
2
8
2
3
12
26
6
1
0
18
30
0
10
10
3
2
28
6
10
6
3

47
71
2
16
8
16
17
8
2
84
94
24
15
27
6
14
43
112
18
4
1
84
215
2
85
60
4
19
150
31
36
46
9

1,392

1,616

1,706

1,742

1,641

1,669

9,766
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